Reflections on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the March and the Speech: History, Memory, Values by Purcell, Jr., Edward A.
digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship Articles & Chapters
2015
Reflections on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the
March and the Speech: History, Memory, Values
Edward A. Purcell, Jr.
New York Law School
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.
Recommended Citation
59 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 17 (2014-2015)
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR. 
Reflections on the Fiftieth Anniversary 
of the March and the Speech: History, 
Memory, Values 
59 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 17 (2014-2015) 
ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Edward A. Purcell, Jr. is the Joseph Solomon Distinguished Professor at New 
York Law School. The author would like to thank David Chang and Erika Wood for their valuable comments 
on the paper, and :Michael McCarthy, Jordan Moss, and Dana Cimera for their assistance in its preparation. 
17 
REFLECTIONS ON THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MARCH AND THE SPEECH 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In early 1941, A. Philip Randolph, the head of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car 
Porters, announced his plan to dramatize the economic grievances of American blacks 
by sponsoring a march on Washington.1 He initially hoped to attract some 10,000 
supporters, but growing enthusiasm in the black community led him to believe that 
many times that number might turn out. The Franklin D. Roosevelt administration, 
fearing violence and anticipating damaging political repercussions, sought repeatedly 
to persuade him to abandon the plan. 2 After rejecting several compromise offers, 
Randolph finally secured one he liked. He agreed to call off the march in exchange 
for the president's promise to establish a Fair Employment Practice Committee 
(FEPC) and ban employment discrimination in defense industries and federal 
agencies. 3 Although political opposition and racial prejudices meant that the resulting 
Executive Order 8802 establishing the FEPC would prove exceptionally controversial 
and bring only limited results, it was the federal government's first substantial effort 
to advance the equal rights cause since Reconstruction. 4 
By 1963, when a black-led march for equal rights finally took place in the nation's 
capital, many things had changed. A national civil rights movement had emerged 
after World War II that was better organized, increasingly militant, more widely and 
enthusiastically embraced by blacks, and supported (or at least accepted) by growing 
numbers of whites. The administration of President John F. Kennedy, moreover, was 
more sympathetic to the civil rights cause than Roosevelt's had been and, though 
initially hoping for immediate political reasons to derail the planned march as 
Roosevelt had done, proved mildly supportive and ultimately welcomed the idea once 
black leaders made it clear that this time they would not be put off.5 
1. See CALVIN CRAIG MILLER, A. PHILIP RANDOLPH AND THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN LABOR MovEMENT 
150 (2005) (chronicling Randolph's involvement in the African American labor movement); PAULA F. 
PFEFFER, A. PHILIP RANDOLPH, PIONEER OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MovEMENT 47 (1990). See generally 
MELINDA CHATEAUVERT, MARCHING ToGETHER: WoMEN oF THE BRoTHERHOOD oF SLEEPING CAR 
PoRTERS (1998); HERBERT GARFINKEL, WHEN NEGROES MARCH: THE MARCH oN WASHINGTON 
MovEMENT IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL PoLITics FOR FEPC (1959). 
2. PFEFFER, supra note 1, at 47-49. Like all Democratic presidents between Reconstruction and the 1960s, 
Roosevelt was exceptionally sensitive to the party's Southern base and acutely aware of his need for its 
continued support. See generally NANCY J. WEISS, FAREWELL TO THE PARTY OF LINCOLN: BLACK 
PoLITICS IN THE AGE OF FDR (1983). For more about the South and its subsequent shift of allegiance 
to the Republicans after the 1960s, see, e.g., WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE WHITE HousE LooKs 
SouTH: FRANKLIN D. RoosEVELT, HARRY S. TRUMAN, AND LYNDON B. JoHNSON (2005). 
3. PHILIP A. KLINKNER & RoGERs M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RisE AND DEcLINE oF 
RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 154-60 (1999). 
4. The FEPC "was the most controversial federal agency in the nation during [World War II] and perhaps 
in modern American history." MERLE. REED, SEEDTIME FOR THE MoDERN CIVIL RIGHTS MovEMENT: 
THE PRESIDENT's CoMMITTEE ON FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE, 1941-1946, at 1 (1991). For more 
information on the importance of economic issues in civil rights litigation in the 1940s, see generally 
RISA L. GoLUBOFF, THE LosT PRoMISE OF CiviL RIGHTS (2007). 
5. "There will be a march," Randolph announced boldly at a White House meeting between civil rights 
leaders and top administration officials-including President Kennedy. TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE 
WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1954-63, at 839-40 (1988) [hereinafter BRANCH, PARTING 
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Indeed, in 1963 it was Randolph himself-still active and influential at the age 
of seventy-four-who once again proposed a march in the nation's capital.6 Ever 
since 1941, "the dream of such a march had burned brightly in his mind," James 
Farmer, one of the March's leaders, recalled.7 Rallying to show a united front and 
organizing with the greatest thoroughness, black civil rights leaders and their 
organizations produced one of the signal events of the 1960s and one of the landmarks 
in the long struggle to end racial injustice in America. 
Part II of this article examines the March and its high point, Martin Luther King, 
Jr.'s "I Have a Dream" speech, and their impact on millions of Americans. Part III 
considers the place of the March and the Speech in the broader history of race relations 
and civil rights campaigns in America, ending with the triumphant passage of the 
great Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965. Part IV recounts the history of the subsequent 
half century, focusing on the fading of what was called "The Civil Rights Movement" 
and the political transformation of the Republican Party. Concluding with a discussion 
of the concomitant transformation of the U.S. Supreme Court, Part IV examines the 
decision of the Court's five conservative justices in Shelby County v. Holder, 8 which-on 
the fiftieth anniversary of the March and the Speech-overturned a central provision 
of the 1965 act. This article argues that their decision was legally and factually 
unjustified and that it exemplifies the political and ideological values that drive the 
Court's current conservative majority. A brief conclusion estimates the long-term 
significance of both Shelby County and King's dream. 
II. THE MARCH AND THE SPEECH 
A. History 
On Wednesday, August 28, 1963, more than 250,000 people-some twenty 
percent of whom were white9-gathered for what was heralded as the March on 
Washington for Jobs and Freedom.10 Designed in significant part to generate support 
THE WATERS). Subsequently, at a press conference held a month before the March, Kennedy carefully 
but favorably "characterized the March as 'a peaceful assembly calling for a redress of grievances,'" and 
defended it as "'in the great tradition.'" CARL M. BRAUER, JoHN F. KENNEDY AND THE SECOND 
RECONSTRUCTION 291 (1977). 
6. }AMES FARMER, LAY BARE THE HEART: AN AuTOBIOGRAPHY oF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MovEMENT 
238-39 (1985); MARTIN LuTHER KING, }R., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 149 (Signet Classic 2000) (1964). 
But see ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, To REDEEM THE SouL OF AMERICA: THE SouTHERN CHRISTIAN 
LEADERSHIP CoNFERENCE &MARTIN LuTHER KING, JR. 150 (1987) (giving King most of the credit 
for inspiring and shaping the March). 
7. FARMER, supra note 6, at 239. 
8. 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2617 (2013). The five conservative justices in the majority were Chief Justice John 
Roberts and Associate Justices Antonio Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel 
Alito. ld. 
9. THOMAS GENTILE, MARCH ON WASHINGTON: AUGUST 28, 1963, at 1 (1983). 
10. The general story of the March and the Speech has been frequently recounted. In summarizing those 
events, I have drawn largely on Thomas Gentile's book March on Washington: August 28, 1963, and the 
first volume of Taylor Branch's superb three-volume biography of Martin Luther King, Jr. entitled 
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for a new and relatively far-reaching civil rights bill that the Kennedy administration 
had recently sent to Congress/ 1 the March ultimately packed most of the long area 
that stretched from the Lincoln Memorial to the Capitol. It seemed a stunning 
culmination of years of increasingly militant local civil rights campaigns that had 
occurred across the South and much of the country. At the time, it was the largest 
such political march in American history. 
For months, organizers had debated tone and tactics, the content of the planned 
speeches, and the practical purposes the event might serve. Bayard Rustin, the head 
of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), who was primarily 
responsible for day-to-day planning and organization, originally suggested that the 
March end with a sit-in at the Capitol, while John Lewis, the head of the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), wanted speeches with aggressive 
rhetoric and actions that would directly confront and challenge the status quo. 
Countering their proposals, however, most of the other March leaders urged a safer 
and more restrained approach. Recognizing the potential for violence and political 
backlash, and under steady pressure from the White House, they sought a disciplined 
and orderly demonstration that would show the internal unity of the civil rights 
movement, prove its peaceful and nonviolent nature, and keep the spotlight fixed on 
its compelling political and moral claims. The heads of the long-established and more 
conservative organizations, Roy Wilkins of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and Whitney Young of the Urban 
League, joined Randolph, Farmer of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and 
Martin Luther King, Jr. of the SCLC in insisting that success depended on the March 
remaining disciplined and-above all-peaceful.12 Deeply concerned about possible 
disruptions or violence by marchers, unaffiliated blacks, and especially angry white 
onlookers, Rustin worked overtime with the police to arrange for the strictest security 
and brought in an additional 4,000 volunteer marshals from New York to help 
maintain order.13 
Eight days before the March, the leaders sent an engraved invitation to every 
member of Congress inviting them to attend, and they set aside a section of chairs in 
front of the podium for them. Almost half replied and more than eighty attended, 
Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-63. See generally GENTILE, supra note 9; BRANCH, 
PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 5. 
11. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong. (1963). For a chronicle of the White House meetings with civil rights leaders, 
the deliberations among Kennedy's staff: and the evolution in the president's thinking as his relationship 
with King grew closer, see BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 5, at 807-09, 822-24; BRAUER, 
supra note 5, at 259-67. 
12. Randolph, Wilkins, Young, King, Lewis, and Farmer were sometimes called "the Big Six." GENTILE, 
supra note 9, at 3, 10; FARMER, supra note 6, at 238-39. Together with Rustin, they largely determined 
the nature of the MarciL GENTILE, supra note 9, at 3-16; see also DAVID LEVERING LEWIS, KING: A 
BIOGRAPHY 227-29 (3d ed. 2013); BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 5, at 870-83. Malcolm 
X apparently was the one who initially coined the label "the Big Six" and intended it as a derogatory 
term rhyming with "the Big Fix." JAMES H. CoNE, MARTIN &MALCOLM &AMERICA: A DREAM OR A 
NIGHTMARE 118 (1991). 
13. BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 5, at 872. 
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though many declined on the ground that Congress was in session and they could not 
get away.14 Few Southern senators even bothered to respond, but Democratic Senator 
Olin D. Johnston of South Carolina sent a telegram that likely captured their view: 
I positively will not attend. You are committing the worst possible mistake in 
promoting this March. You should know that criminal, fanatical, and 
communistic elements, as well as crackpots, will move in to take every 
advantage of this mob. You certainly will have no influence on any member of 
Congress, including myself.15 
The sharpest controversy among the March leaders erupted during the two days 
immediately prior to the event, when members of SNCC-including James Forman, 
Julian Bond, and Eleanor Holmes-helped prepare a stinging speech for Lewis and 
circulated advance copies.16 Their draft criticized the Kennedy administration's 
pending civil rights bill, condemned the arrests of thousands of civil rights activists 
on "trumped up charges," and called on "the masses" to bring about "radical social, 
political and economic changes."17 Forman added a particularly inflammatory 
passage declaring, among other things: "We will march through the South, through 
the heart of Dixie, the way Sherman did."18 Most of the other leaders saw the speech 
as far too radical, and Rustin quickly arranged an emergency meeting in a Washington 
hotel that produced an angry debate over censorship, political tactics, and the very 
purpose of the March itself. A last minute compromise left Lewis with most of his 
rhetoric intact, including an appeal to "the black masses," a call for "a serious social 
revolution," and the charge that most American politicians had "(built] their careers 
on immoral compromises" and "political, economic, and social exploitation."19 He 
agreed, however, to delete a few of his most provocative assertions, including the 
passage about repeating Sherman's march.20 
In spite of the leaders' promises that the March would be peaceful, including 
repeated assurances that Wilkins and King gave on national television, public 
anxieties ran high.21 A number of white supporters, including some Democratic 
congressional leaders, worried that the March would backfire and fan opposition to 
the administration's civil rights bill.22 Many others feared far worse-some warning 
that bands of black marauders would run wild in the capital's streets. Anticipating 
14. GENTILE, supra note 9, at 136-37; see a/so BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 5, at 881. 
15. GENTILE, supra note 9, at 138. 
16. See id. at 164-83. 
17. BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 5, at 873. 
18. !d. at 873-74. Forman's insertion continued in heated-if ambiguously qualified-language. "We shall 
pursue our own 'scorched earth' policy and burn Jim Crow to the ground-nonviolently. We shall crack 
the South into a thousand pieces and put them back together in the image of democracy." ld. at 874. 
19. I d. at 880. 
20. Id. at 879-80. 
21. Id. at 871-72. 
22. BRAUER, supra note 5, at 291. 
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the worst, the city prohibited liquor sales, area hospitals cancelled elective surgeries, 
merchants moved their goods out of stores and into locked warehouses, and the 
Washington Senators baseball team postponed two games until the day had passed. 
For its part, the administration drafted an emergency proclamation authorizing the 
restoration of order by 4,000 assembled troops backed by an additional 15,000 
paratroopers on stand-by. 23 
When the day of the March finally arrived, however, everything went almost 
perfectly. 24 In the morning, twenty-one chartered railroad trains pulled into 
Washington's Union Station, while more than a hundred buses an hour poured 
steadily into the city through the Baltimore tunnel. Most of the participants came 
from cities along the East Coast and from as far south as Miami, but thousands upon 
thousands more trekked in from as far away as Milwaukee, St. Louis, Little Rock, 
Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, and Detroit. Estimates of the massing throng grew to over 
300,000.25 Rustin's methodical planning provided tight security and furnished some 
80,000 bag lunches, twenty-one drinking fountains, and many first-aid stations and 
portable toilets for the marchers. 26 National television crews, reporters, and 
photographers from across the world, clergymen from the major denominations, 
famous black activists and celebrities from Rosa Parks to Josephine Baker, and a flood 
of glamorous Hollywood stars including Charlton Heston, Sidney Poitier, Burt 
Lancaster, Marlon Brando, and James Garner combined to highlight the importance 
of the event and confirm the widespread and enthusiastic support that the Movement 
had generated. Opening musical performances by Joan Baez, Odetta, Bob Dylan, 
Marian Anderson, Mahalia Jackson, and Peter, Paul and Mary brought the crowd to 
its feet and, when Jackson sang the old Negro spiritual "I've Been 'Buked and I've 
Been Scorned," tears to the eyes of manyY Then speaker after speaker-whom Rustin 
tried to hold to seven minutes each-addressed the crowd with strong, insistent, and 
often moving words. 28 
23. BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 5, at 872; GENTILE, supra note 9, at 129, 148-50. On the 
night before the March,]. Edgar Hoover continued his efforts to undermine the civil rights movement 
by ordering FBI agents to telephone celebrities who were planning to attend the March and to warn 
them to stay away because the government expected violence. BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra 
note 5, at 876; CuRT GENTRY, J. EDGAR HoovER: THE MAN AND THE SECRETS 527 (1991). 
24. In retrospect, one obvious embarrassment-typical of most American political organizations and 
campaigns until the emergence of the women's movement in late 1960s-was the fact that the March 
leaders refused to allow any women speakers. "In essence, the role and importance of women in the civil 
rights movement was brushed aside by the March's all-male leadership." GENTILE, supra note 9, at 142. 
25. BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 5, at 876, 878; GENTILE, supra note 9, at 184-88, 190-92. 
26. BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 5, at 873. Critical to the event, the organizers had installed 
a high-quality public address system and placed forty-six "massive speakers" on two large towers along 
the sides of the Lincoln Memorial's Reflecting Pool, allowing most of the crowd to hear the performers 
and speakers quite well. GENTILE, supra note 9, at 147-48. 
27. GENTILE, supra note 9, at 208-19; BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 5, at 877, 881. 
28. BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 5, at 873, 877-81. For a summary of the events and the 
speeches of the other leaders, see GENTILE, supra note 9, at 184-255. 
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Watching on television from his jail cell in Donaldsonville, Louisiana, where he 
had remained after his arrest for leading a protest against police brutality, Farmer 
wept at the sight. It was, he declared, an "awesome spectacle."29 King was equally 
ecstatic. "[I]n its entire glittering history," he later wrote, "Washington had never 
seen a spectacle of the size and grandeur that assembled there on August 28, 1963."30 
Finally, as the last speaker of the day, King himself came forward. Introduced by 
Randolph as "the moral leader of our nation," he spurred a rolling cascade of applause 
that lasted almost a full minute.Jl King had been working on his speech for two days, 
blending words and ideas that fit the needs of the occasion with those he had been 
using widely for a decade.32 The day had been hot; the program had lasted for hours; 
and the crowd was growing tired. Still, it seemed a fitting and climactic moment, 
and for millions of Americans across the land the timing of King's appearance was 
ideal. While CBS had been televising the entire event live, by the time King came to 
the podium both ABC and NBC had cut away from their regular programming and 
joined the live coverage.33 To the greatest extent possible at the time, the entire 
nation was watching. 
Speaking in his deep baritone voice, with cadences slow and resounding, King 
roused the audience repeatedly. Insisting on "the fierce urgency of now," he exhorted 
his listeners to redouble their efforts and to insist on justice and equality now. "This 
is no time to engage in the luxury of cooling off or to take the tranquilizing drug of 
gradualism," he declared. "Now is the time to make real the promises of democracy." 
Still, he stressed, their efforts must remain nonviolent. "Again and again, we must 
rise to the majestic heights of meeting physical force with soul force."34 
Nearing the end of his prepared remarks, reaching what seemed their relatively 
weak and anticlimactic conclusion, King suddenly hesitated. 35 Perhaps an experienced 
preacher's intuition whispered that he might be losing an audience fatigued from the 
heat of the long August day. Perhaps he suddenly felt compelled to preach the essence 
of his message on an occasion that he sensed would never come again. Although his 
seven minutes had expired, those on the platform urged him to continue. Then 
Mahalia Jackson's distinctive voice piped up. "Tell 'em about the dream, Martin," she 
29. FARMER, supra note 6, at 245. 
30. MARTIN LuTHER KING, ]R., THE AuTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARTIN LuTHER KING, ]R. 221 (Clayborne 
Carson ed., 1998) [hereinaftec KING, AuTOBIOGRAPHY]. For King's description of the March, see id. at 
218-28. King's autobiography, authorized by his estate, was assembled posthumously from his published 
and unpublished writings. 
31. BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 5, at 881. 
32. Id. at 875-76, 881-83. For the full text of the Speech, see MARTIN LuTHER KING, ]R., A TESTAMENT 
OF HoPE: THE EssENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LuTHER KING, ]R. 217-20 (James 
Melvin Washington ed., 1986) [hereinafter KING, TESTAMENT OF HoPE]. 
33. BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 5, at 881; see also ANIKO BooROGHKOZY, EQUAL TIME: 
TELEVISION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MovEMENT 101 (2012). 
34. KING, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 30, at 224-25; KING, TESTAMENT OF HoPE, supra note 32, at 218. 
35. BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 5, at 882. 
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called. Whether or not King heard her, he did just that. 36 Abandoning his text, drawing 
on the deep well of long years of activism and an even longer life in the pulpit, he 
launched extemporaneously into what would become his overpowering peroration. 
"I still have a dream," he proclaimed. "It is a dream deeply rooted in the American 
dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its 
creed-we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal."37 
Then, invoking a series of parallel images that resonated with Scripture and 
illustrated the dream of justice and equality for all, he built methodically toward his 
climax. First assurances of hope, next the promise of faith rewarded, and then the 
stern and righteous demand that at long last Americans "let freedom ring" across the 
land and from coast to coast, even over "Stone Mountain of Georgia" and "every hill 
and molehill of Mississippi." Finally, with an emotional impact that thrilled, he 
brought his audience to the Promised Land: 
And when we allow freedom to ring, when we let it ring from every village 
and hamlet, from every state and city, we will be able to speed up that day 
when all of God's children-black men and white men, Jews and Gentiles, 
Catholics and Protestants-will be able to join hands and to sing in the words 
of the old Negro spiritual, "Free at last, free at last; thank God Almighty, we 
are free at last."38 
It was electrifying.39 The crowd on the Washington Mall exploded in passionate 
applause, and millions watching on television responded with a new understanding 
and often a new and enduring commitment. The Speech "ignited something in me 
that has lasted forever," explained one participant.40 "When Mahalia Jackson sang 
and Martin Luther King, Jr., spoke," Farmer recalled, "my tears disappeared and were 
36. It is not clear whether King actually heard Jackson's voice. Id. at 882. He later recalled the moment 
without mentioning her: 
The audience's response was wonderful that day, and all of a sudden this thing came to 
me. The previous June, following a peaceful assemblage of thousands of people through 
the streets of downtown Detroit, Michigan, I had delivered a speech in Cobo Hall, in 
which I used the phrase "I have a dream." I had used it many times before, and I just felt 
that I wanted to use it here. I don't know why. I hadn't thought about it before the 
speech. I used the phrase, and at that point I just turned aside from the manuscript 
altogether and didn't come back to it. 
KING, AuTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 30, at 223. But see GENTILE, supra note 9, at 163 (suggesting that 
King's "original idea" was to talk about the Dream but that he had discarded it because of Rustin's 
seven-minute limit on speeches). 
37. KING, TESTAMENT OF HoPE, supra note 32, at 219. 
38. Id. at 220. 
39. LEWIS, supra note 12, at 229; see a/so BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 5, at 882-83. 
40. Witnesses to History: 50 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2013/08/23/us/march-on-washington-anniversary-memories.html?emc=etal. "I remember that I 
looked down at my dad and he was crying," recalled a women who was only seven years old at the time. 
"I realized years later why." A North Carolina woman remembered "strangers, black and white, hugging 
each other." She continued: "Even now when I hear the speech, I'll start crying. I don't care where I am, 
tears will start coming." !d. 
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replaced with awe."41 James Baldwin, who had been skeptical about the March, 
declared that "it almost seemed that we stood on a height, and could see our 
inheritance; perhaps we could make the kingdom real."42 Watching on television, 
President Kennedy exclaimed, "He's damn good," and greeted King at the White 
House later that day by saying simply "I have a dream."43 William Sullivan, the 
assistant director of the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, rendered the same judgment, 
though spinning its significance to please his boss, the Bureau's racist and virulently 
anti-King director, J. Edgar Hoover.44 King gave a "powerful demagogic speech," 
Sullivan reported, and as a result he was now "the most dangerous Negro of the future 
of this Nation from the standpoint of Communism, the Negro and national security.'~5 
In his autobiography King downplayed the importance of his speech in favor of 
emphasizing the combined impact of all the speakers and, especially, the significance 
of the massive and peaceful march itself. "[T]he stirring emotion came from the mass 
of ordinary people who stood in majestic dignity as witnesses to their single minded 
determination to achieve democracy in their time," he explained. "The enormous 
multitude was the living, beating heart of an indefinitely noble movement.''46 The 
March was "the first organized Negro operation that was accorded respect and 
coverage commensurate with its importance."47 The fact that it was nationally televised 
was critical. "Millions of white Americans, for the first time, had a clear, long look at 
Negroes engaged in a serious occupation," King explained. "For the first time millions 
listened to the informed and thoughtful words ofNegro spokesmen, from all walks of 
life."48 He summed up the event in his typical style, invoking the noblest of human 
hopes and proclaiming the event's worldwide resonance: 
41. FARMER, supra note 6, at 245. 
42. Michiko Kakutani, The Dream, the Speech and Its Lasting Power, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2013, at Al, A18 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
43. BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 5, at 883. After the March, Kennedy issued a short 
statement praising the event. "'We have witnessed today in Washington tens of thousands of 
Americans-both Negro and white-exercising their right to assemble peacefully and direct the widest 
possible attention to a great national issue.'" LEWIS, supra note 12, at 230. 
44. Many of his associates "noted Hoover's growing obsession with destroying King." GENTRY, supra note 
23, at 505. 
45. DAVID J. GARROW, THE FBI AND MARTIN LuTHER KING, JR. 68 (1981); see also GENTRY, supra note 23, 
at 528. More apt criticism came from a few of the Movement's sympathizers. One veteran civil rights 
activist expressed annoyance with King that some other blacks may have shared. "Martin had no right 
to say 'I have a dream'; why, we have all had that dream for generations." AuGUST MEIER & ELLIOTT 
RunwiCK, FRoM PLANTATION TO GHETTO 290 (3d ed. 1976) (quoting an unnamed "old-line" activist) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Before changing his mind and adopting a far more favorable view, 
David Levering Lewis, who criticized King from the Left, denigrated the Speech as "rhetoric almost 
without content." LEWIS, supra note 12, at 228. Thomas Gentile suggested that many marchers were 
tired from the long, hot day and that the Speech was not for them "the moving experience that it 
became later on in hindsight." GENTILE, supra note 9, at 249. 
46. KING, AuTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 30, at 222. 
47. Id. at 227. 
48. ld. 
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As television beamed the image of this extraordinary gathering across the 
border oceans, everyone who believed in man's capacity to better himself had 
a moment of inspiration and confidence in the future of the human race. And 
every dedicated American could be proud that a dynamic experience of 
democracy in the nation's capital had been made visible to the world.49 
B. Memory 
The March and the "I Have a Dream" speech helped shape my own personal 
views, and as a historian I cannot avoid acknowledging the extent to which those 
views have influenced my memory, my political values, and my understanding of 
those now long-past events. In that, however, I am hardly alone. For Americans, 
memories of the March and the Speech, like almost all matters involving race, have 
an unavoidably personal component. The realities of race have touched us all in 
countless ways, some obvious and some less so. Some perhaps buried too deeply to be 
fully uncovered. Race has helped shape every aspect of our national life. 5° 
As a young student, I was one of the millions of people across the nation and world 
who were educated and inspired by the civil rights movement. The courage and 
commitment of those who engaged in boycotts, sit-ins, Freedom Rides, and so many 
other similar actions quickly commanded my attention and earned my admiration. I 
was also one of the many millions who King reached and moved with his faith, 
humanity, and passion for simple and long-overdue justice. The March helped convince 
us that substantial changes could actually be achieved, and the "I Have a Dream" 
speech seemed to provide the noble vision that could, as Abraham Lincoln had prayed 
at Gettysburg, lead the nation to rededicate itself to "a new birth of freedom."51 
Looking back from the present, I am embarrassed to recognize what little 
awareness I had about racial matters as I was growing up in a pleasant, white, working-
class neighborhood in Kansas City, Missouri in the 1940s and 1950s. I do remember 
that at some point my parents and their friends began to talk about black people 
moving into nearby areas. Few of them used the nastiest forms of racist language, at 
least in front of their children, but they expressed their fears and anxieties clearly, and 
often made their underlying anger apparent. I also recall the summer afternoon when, 
for the first time, several young black boys appeared at the local baseball field and 
stood quietly on the sidelines hoping to be invited to join our game. Shortly thereafter, 
my family moved across town to what was called a "better neighborhood." 
Through those early years I do not recall ever associating with or even actually 
knowing a black person. There were none in my grade school class, our local Catholic 
49. !d. at 228. For a broad selection of King's work, see KING, TESTAMENT OF HoPE, supra note 32. 
50. This is nowhere more apparent than in our constitutional law, especially in the interpretation and 
application of what are called the "principles of federalism." See, e.g., EDWARD A. PuRCELL, JR., 
0RIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL 
INQUIRY 63-65 (2007). 
51. President Abraham Lincoln, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettysburg, Final 
Draft (Nov. 19, 1863), in 7 THE CoLLECTED WoRKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 23 (Roy P. Basler eta!. 
eds., 1953), available at http://quod.lib.umich.edu/l/lincoln/lincoln7/1 :40?rgn=div1;view=fulltext. 
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church, or the summer baseball leagues where my friends and I played; and there 
were none in my class at the small Jesuit high school I attended-though there were 
two or three in other years. I do, however, remember one classmate who befriended 
me early in my freshman year. He turned out to be an overt racist who soon began 
making mocking, derogatory comments about both blacks and Jews-comments 
that surprised me and that I somehow had the good sense to find both puzzling and 
disturbing. By sophomore year we had parted company. 
In college, things began to change. I had been wholly oblivious to the Montgomery 
Bus Boycott in 1955, but the sit-ins and Freedom Rides that began in 1960 quickly 
intruded into my consciousness. Fortunately, too, by then I had another friend who was 
far more enlightened than I was. He urged me to support what he called the Kansas 
City Equality Team, a group he had organized in an effort to persuade local restaurants 
and businesses to serve black students. More influential, I also had a new black 
teammate on my amateur basketball team. His name was also "Ed," and he was the 
first black person I came to know on a regular and personal basis. 
My most acute memory of Ed did not occur on a basketball court. Our team had 
just won an important game, and several teammates urged us all to mark the victory 
by crossing over into Kansas-where the legal drinking age was eighteen, compared 
with twenty-one in Missouri-to celebrate at their favorite hangout, a bar and 
restaurant called "Morrie's." I remember my growing sense of unease as Ed tried to 
beg off on some or other excuse, but then, after repeated entreaties, finally agreed to 
join us. I remember entering Morrie's and turning back to see Ed step through the 
door and then stand motionless in the entryway, a strange and taut expression on his 
face. I remember the owner, who had been working behind the bar when we entered, 
looking up and then immediately rushing toward us shouting in an angry and almost 
fierce voice: "The bar is closed! The bar is closed!" Shocked and speechless in our 
naivete, we looked at one another blankly and then, vaguely understanding, turned 
and walked out. I remember realizing that Ed must have been harboring a knowing 
sense of foreboding all along and afterwards, though he never said a word, must have 
felt a stinging hurt. I remember, too, feeling a deep sense of shame and embarrassment, 
a feeling that held me back from ever even mentioning to Ed what had happened 
that night. Never again did our team attempt to go to a bar or restaurant together. 
Morrie's remained open until I graduated from college and left Kansas City, but I 
never went back. 
As a historical matter the incident at Morrie's was utterly trivial, but it seems 
worth recording. Its very triviality shows the extent to which overt public racial 
discrimination remained an ordinary and everyday occurrence in 1960.52 Further, it 
52. In 1961, discussing a sit-in case in conference, Justice Hugo Black warned his colleagues about the 
dangers of integrating lunch counters: "Many people in the South would be alarmed at the mere 
presence of black people sitting there." THE SuPREME CouRT IN CoNFERENCE (1940-1985), at 709 (Del 
Dickson ed., 2001). A few years earlier, a Virginia judge had issued an opinion upholding a conviction 
under the state's anti-miscegenation law: 
Almighty God created the races white, yellow, malay and red, and He placed them on 
separate continents. And but for the interference with His arrangement there would be 
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illustrates the unavoidably personal nature of race relations in America, the countless 
ways in which race has touched-and continues to touch-each and every one of us. 
For my part, a half century later, I still remember that night at Morrie's and the way 
it sharpened my awareness and pierced my conscience. As for Ed, I can only guess. 
For him, the memory of what happened that night may have wholly faded away, 
blended into a mass of other similar-and perhaps far more hurtful-experiences. 
Ill. IMPACT AND SIGNIFICANCE 
A. History 
The historical significance of the March on Washington and the "I Have a 
Dream" speech can, of course, hardly be assessed in isolation. As a matter of history, 
they were but small parts of a complex and long-evolving struggle. 
1. The Slighted Context 
Focusing on the March and the "I Have a Dream" speech elides a vast historical 
drama. It overlooks not only those on the front lines who regularly endured terrible 
dangers and too often suffered accordingly, but also those who sustained the 
Movement with essential but unspectacular organizational and back-office work. 53 It 
overlooks the steady and often unrecognized efforts of local civil rights workers and 
organizations in towns, cities, and states across the nation,54 and it overlooks the mass 
no cause for such marriages. The fact that He separated the races shows that He did not 
intend for the races to mix. 
ld. at 695; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967) (quoting the Virgina state trial court judge). 
53. See generally RAYMOND ARSENAULT, FREEDOM RIDERS: 1961 AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL jUSTICE 
(2006); THOMAS L. BYNUM, NAACP YouTH AND THE FIGHT FOR BLACK FRHDOM, 1936-1965 
(2013); REBELLION IN BLACK AND WHITE: SouTHERN STUDENT AcTIVISM IN THE 1960s (Robert 
Cohen & David J. Snyder eds., 2013); ZoE A. CoLLEY, AIN'T ScARED OF YouR jAIL: ARREST, 
IMPRISONMENT, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MovEMENT (2012); SouTHERN BLACK WoMEN IN THE 
MoDERN CiviL RIGHTS MovEMENT (Bruce A. Glasrud & Merline Pitre eds., 2013); ARAM 
GouDsouziAN, DowN To THE CRossROADS: CIVIL RIGHTS, BLACK PowER, AND THE MEREDITH 
MARCH AGAINST FEAR (2014); AuGUST MEIER & ELLIOTT RuDWICK, CORE: A STUDY IN THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS MovEMENT, 1942-1968 (1973); lBRAM H. RoGERS, THE BLACK CAMPUS MovEMENT: BLACK 
STUDENTS AND THE RACIAL RECONSTITUTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION, 1965-1972 (2012). 
54. See generally STEPHEN R. HAYNES, THE LAST SEGREGATED HouR: THE MEMPHIS KNEEL-INs AND THE 
CAMPAIGN FOR SouTHERN CHuRCH DESEGREGATION (2012); THE BusiNESS oF BLACK PowER: 
CoMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, CAPITALISM, AND CoRPORATE RESPONSIBILITY IN PosTWAR AMERICA 
(Laura Warren Hill & Julia Rabig eds., 2012); BENJAMIN HousTON, THE NASHVILLE WAY: RACIAL 
ETIQUETTE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SociAL JusTICE IN A SouTHERN CITY (2012); BRIAN PuRNELL, 
FIGHTING jiM CRow IN THE CouNTY oF KINGs: THE CoNGRESS OF RAciAL EQUALITY IN BROOKLYN 
(2013); LEE SARTAIN, BORDERS OF EQUALITY: THE NAACP AND THE BALTIMORE CIVIL RIGHTS 
STRUGGLE, 1914-1970 (2013); SARAH CAROLINE THUESEN, GREATER THAN EQUAL: AFRICAN 
AMERICAN STRUGGLES FOR ScHooLs AND CITIZENSHIP IN NoRTH CAROLINA, 1919-1965 (2013). 
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of Americans, black and white, whose support, however limited or belated, helped 
give the Movement its growing momentum and ultimate political power. 55 
Further, such a focus minimizes the internal complexities of the civil rights 
movement and the extent to which both activists and the black community in general 
were often sharply divided over tactics and goals. 56 It ignores the challenges that 
Malcolm X presented and minimizes the deep skepticism of the more radical activists 
in both CORE and SNCC.57 It passes over the great difficulties that black civil 
rights lawyers confronted in representing the Movement and its supporters,58 and it 
ignores the embarrassing fact that a small but noticeable number of blacks actually 
cooperated with white segregationists and worked to undermine the Movement.59 
More broadly, it passes over a multitude of critical social and political factors. It 
ignores the significance of black migrations out of the South, the social and cultural 
impact of World War II, the NAACP's methodical campaign that led to Brown v. 
Board of Education60 and other constitutional victories, and the social and economic 
hardships that continued to plague black communities in both the North and the 
South. 61 It passes over the role of local and national politics, including the complex and 
conflicted roles of the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations in 
attempting to address the mounting pressures the Movement generated.62 It overlooks 
55. See, e.g., GARY MAY, Prologue to BENDING TowARD JusTICE: THE VoTING RIGHTS AcT AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, at ix (2013) ("This book tells the story of the struggles 
of ordinary people, many unknown to most Americans, who were, in fact, quite extraordinary. They 
risked all to obtain a fundamental American right that had been codified in the Constitution's Fifteenth 
Amendment, though it was not fulfilled until1965."). 
56. See, e.g., BRAUER, supra note 5, at 114-15;jAMES OLIVER HoRTON & LOis E. HoRTON, l-IARD RoAD TO 
FREEDOM: THE STORY OF AFRICAN AMERICA 294-321 (2001); MEIER & RuDWICK, supm note 45, at 
251-98. 
57. See, e.g., BRITTA WALDSCHMIDT-NELSON, DREAMS AND NIGHTMARES: MARTIN LuTHER KING ]R., 
MALCOLM X, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY IN AMERICA (2012). 
58. Civil rights lawyers, both black and white, shouldered many burdens in supporting the Movement, but 
black lawyers generally faced their own special challenges. See generally KENNETH W. MAcK, 
REPRESENTING HIE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER (2012). See also William B. 
Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights 
Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623 (1997). 
59. RANDALL KENNEDY, SELLOUT: THE POLITICS OF RACIAL BETRAYAL 50-54 (2008); see also BRANCH, 
PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 5, at 873-74, 916 (describing the more militant element's fundamental 
disagreements with the entire premise underlying the March, which Malcolm later declared should 
have been called the "Farce on Washington"). 
60. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
61. See, e.g., MARK V. TusHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAw: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SuPREME 
CouRT, 1936-1961 (1994); MARK V. TusH NET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED 
EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987). For a history of the earlier struggles that minimizes Brown's importance, 
see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM ]1M CRow TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SuPREME CouRT AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004). 
62. See, e.g., BRAUER, supra note 5; RoBERT FREDRICK BuRK, THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND BLACK 
CIVIL RIGHTS, 1953-1961 (1984); RoBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS oF LYNDON JoHNsoN: MASTER oF THE 
SENATE (2002) [hereinafter CARO, MASTER OF THE SENATE]; RoBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON 
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the FBI's disgraceful and unlawful efforts to stifle the civil rights movement and 
intimidate its leaders, 63 and it ignores the extent to which the demands of American 
foreign policy both encouraged and limited the Movement's achievements.64 Most 
broadly, it ignores the other vibrant social and political movements that exploded in the 
1960s and affected the campaign for black civil rights,65 and it overlooks completely the 
pervasive anti-colonialist social and cultural transformations that were sweeping across 
much of the world in the same decade.66 
Finally, a focus on the March and the Speech misses the powerful if immeasurable 
contributions that generations of black writers and intellectuals made in educating so 
many white Americans. In particular, I think of the work of Frederick Douglass and 
W.E.B. DuBois, ofJean Toomer and Richard Wright, and ofJames Baldwin, Ralph 
Ellison, Amiri Baraka, and John Hope FranklinY They opened our eyes, aroused 
our sympathies, and deepened our understanding. Their imprints, especially those of 
Native Son and Invisible Man, remain with me today.68 
JoHNSON: THE PASSAGE OF PowER (2012) [hereinafter CARO, PAsSAGE OF PowER]; RICHARD M. 
DALFIUME, DESEGREGATION OF TilE U.S. ARMED FORCES: FIGHTING ON Two FRONTS, 1939-1953 (1969). 
63. "In January 1959, entirely on his own and without officially opening a security investigation, Hoover 
ordered FBI agents to burglarize the SCLC offices. It was the first of twenty known break-ins between 
that date and January 1964." GENTRY, supra note 23, at 501; see also GARROW, supra note 45. 
64. See MARY L. DuDziAK, CoLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
(2000). 
65. See, e.g., TERRY H. ANDERSON, THE MovEMENT AND THE SixTIES: PROTEST IN AMERICA FROM 
GREENSBORO TO WouNDED KNEE (1995); THE SIXTIES PAPERS: DocuMENTS OF A REBELLious 
DECADE (Judith Clavir Albert & Stewart Edward Albert eds., 1984); ToDD GITLIN, THE SixTIES: 
YEARS OF HoPE, DAYS OF RAGE (1987); REASSESSING THE SIXTIES: DEBATING THE POLITICAL AND 
CuLTURAL LEGACY (Stephen Macedo ed., 1997). 
66. The civil rights movement in the United States was part of "a global movement-something that has 
never existed before in this form." HANNAH ARENDT, THoUGHTS ON PoLITICS AND REVOLUTION, 
reprinted in THE LAST INTERVIEW AND OTHER CoNvERSATIONS 69-70 (2013). See also THOMAS 
BoRSTELMANN, THE CoLD WAR AND THE CoLoR LINE: AMERICAN RAcE RELATIONS IN THE GLOBAL 
ARENA 270 (2001) ("The far-reaching changes that swept through the American South in the second 
half of the twentieth century cannot be understood apart from the international context of the Cold 
War. The evolving civil rights movement fit into the larger story of decolonization and the Cold War 
struggle over world leadership and the meaning of 'freedom.'"). See generally ARTHUR MARVICK, THE 
SIXTIES: CuLTURAL REVOLUTION IN BRITAIN, FRANCE, ITALY, AND THE UNITED STATES, c.1958-c.1978 
(1998); BRENDA GAYLE PLUMMER, IN SEARCH OF PowER: AFRICAN AMERICANS IN THE ERA OF 
DECOLONIZATION, 1956-1974 (2013). 
67. See, e.g., HAROLD CausE, THE CRISIS OF THE NEGRO INTELLECTUAL: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
FAILURE oF BLACK LEADERSHIP (1967); DANIEL MATLIN, ON THE CoRNER: AFRICAN-AMERICAN 
INTELLECTUALS AND THE URBAN CRISIS (2013); John S. Wright, To the Battle Royal: Ralph Ellison and 
the Quest jor Black Leadership in Postwar America, in RECASTING AMERICA: CuLTURE AND PoLITICS IN 
THE AGE OF CoLD WAR 246 (Lary May ed., 1989). 
68. See RICHARD WRIGHT, NATIVE SoN (1940); RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN (1952). Consider, for 
example, the evolution of Garry Wills. He began his career as a determined conservative and gradually 
shifted toward the Left as he became one of the country's most prominent independent, and generally 
liberal, intellectuals. The influence of black activists and writers on his thinking seems apparent in a 
transitional book he published in 1968. See GARRY WILLS, THE SECOND CIVIL WAR: ARMING FOR 
ARMAGEDDON (1968). 
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2. Contributions of the March and the Speech 
Recognizing the long and complex historical context that set the stage, it 
nonetheless remains true that the March and the Speech made their own distinctive 
contributions. Together they strengthened the slow but powerful gathering of 
support for the civil rights movement and, in particular, for the groundbreaking civil 
rights legislation that would shortly follow. 
The March itself had special resonance because it came in the wake of growing 
violence against civil rights protests across the South. 69 Perhaps most pivotal, it came 
only three months after national television audiences had witnessed shocking and 
vicious police brutality against hundreds of peaceful civil rights marchers in 
Birmingham, Alabama.'0 Given that prologue, the peaceful and disciplined nature of 
the March seemed to confirm the innocence and legitimacy of those earlier civil 
rights marchers and to indict Birmingham and its police for cruel and unjustified 
violence. Exhibiting the peaceful and nonviolent nature of the Movement and its 
undeniable goals of justice and equality for all, the March accelerated the swing of 
public opinion in favor of the Movement and the general cause of civil rights.71 
The Speech did the same, and in the long run far more. King's role in the civil 
rights movement, Clayborn Carson, the editor of King's papers, concluded, was 
"extraordinary."72 Initially, he had inspired blacks "to believe that their protests had a 
moral and spiritual significance and that they were part of a global struggle to resist 
subordination and injustice."73 Then, at the March, from the platform in front of the 
Lincoln Memorial, he did the same thing for the nation.74 King "transformed prosaic, 
69. In a ten-week period in the late spring and early summer of 1963, "statisticians counted 758 racial 
demonstrations and 14,733 arrests in 186 American cities." BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERs, supra note 
5, at 825. 
70. It was the violence in Birmingham that "changed everything," according to Harvard historian Michael 
Klarman. The "percentage of Americans who deemed civil rights to be the nation's most urgent issue 
rose from four percent before Birmingham to fifty-two percent afterward. A majority of Americans now 
favored expansive civil rights legislation." KLARMAN, supra note 61, at 436. 
71. Opinions vary, but most observers and scholars agree that the March had a considerable impact on 
general public opinion, but relatively little immediate and direct impact on Congress. See, e.g., BRAUER, 
supra note 5, at 292. Much of the influence of the March may have come from its religious overtones. 
"Never before had leading representatives of the Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish faiths identified so 
closely and visibly with black demands." FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 6, at 153. David Levering Lewis issued 
a similar but more pessimistic judgment on the significance of the March. "Hearts were touched; spirits 
were uplifted. But, like any masterfully produced and thematically provocative spectacle, its intrinsic 
and durable impact upon those who walked and those who watched was largely, though by no means 
totally, dissipated against the obdurate mass of prejudice, apathy, and politico-economic stasis in race 
relations." LEWIS, supra note 12, at 229. 
72. CLAYBORNE CARSON, MARTIN'S DREAM: MY joURNEY AND THE LEGACY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, 
j R. 282 (2013). 
73. Jd. 
74. The Speech "virtually defined the March on Washington, effectively stamping it as King's personal 
platform. The march and the speech enhanced King's prestige beyond measure." FAIRCLOUGH, supra 
note 6, at 155. 
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transitory expressions of discontent into inspiring oratory that has endured."75 "The 
slow determination of his cadence," Taylor Branch wrote in his monumental three-
volume biography, "exposed all the more clearly the passion that overshadowed the 
content of the dream."76 The result was transforming. "[T]he emotional command of 
his oratory gave King authority to reinterpret the core intuition of democratic justice," 
Branch explained. "More than his words, the timbre of his voice projected him across 
the racial divide and planted him as a new founding father." 77 
In retrospect, the March set an unparalleled scene, but King commanded the 
stage of history. He impressed on the event, and the nation's conscience, a compelling 
moral vision that urged Americans to their best, confronting them with their own 
highest ideals and calling on them to fulfill them. The words he spoke that day still 
resonate and inspire, and those words ultimately gave that day its paramount and 
enduring historical significance. 
3. High Tide of the Civil Rights Movement 
Combined with subsequent events, major and decisive legislative achievements 
followed the March in short order.78 Kennedy's support for a new and muscular civil 
rights act, his shocking assassination only months later, the ascension to the presidency 
of the savvy and determined Lyndon B. Johnson, and continued civil rights activism 
across the country-especially the mass protests in Birmingham with their 
accompanying police violence and television coverage-generated intense political 
pressure for meaningful congressional action.79 A civil rights bill that seemed to have 
75. CARSON, supra note 72, at 282. 
76. BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS supra note 5, at 882. 
77. ld. at 887. 
78. The Civil Rights Act of1964, Pub. L No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 42 U.S.C.) was enacted less than a year after the March on July 2, 1964, and before the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973bb-1 
(2013)). The March is "generally credited with being a major impetus behind [the] passage of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act." GENTILE, supra note 9, at 1. Indicative of the slowly building pressure for black civil 
rights after Brown (but before the March), Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 
85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.) and the Civil Rights 
Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42 
U.S.C.). The former authorized the Attorney General of the United States to seek injunctions against 
public and private actions taken on racial grounds that hindered the right to vote, Civil Rights Act of 1957 
§ 131(c), 71 Stat. 637, and the latter expanded the power of the attorney general and authorized courts to 
register voters in areas where there was systemic discrimination. 1960 Act § 601, 74 Stat. 90. Both acts, 
however, were weak, sharply limited, and minimally significant. For a fascinating account of the passage 
of the 1957 act, see CARO, MASTER OF THE SENATE, supra note 62, at 886-1014, and for the Civil Rights 
Act of 1960, see id. at 1034. See also BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 5, at 220-22, 331-32; 
j.\V. ANDERSON, EISENHOWER, BRowNELL, AND THE CoNGREss: THE TANGLED ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS BILL OF 1956-1957 (1964). 
79. "Televised brutality against peaceful civil rights demonstrators in Birmingham dramatically altered 
northern opinion on race and enabled the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act." KLARMAN, supra note 
61, at 435. 
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little possibility of passage in the spring of 1963 became law in June of 1964,80 passing 
with overwhelming support from House and Senate members outside of the South.81 
Prohibiting discrimination based on race, sex, color, religion, and national origin, the 
act expanded the enforcement powers of the federal government, created new remedies 
for employment discrimination, struck at segregated educational practices and certain 
restrictions on voting, authorized termination of federal funding for governmental 
agencies that violated the law, and-in what was regarded as its most controversial 
and far-reaching provision-ensured equal treatment for all in services held out to the 
general public: the so-called "public accommodations" provision. 82 
The next year produced the equally pivotal and even more important Voting 
Rights Act of 1965.83 SNCC's "Mississippi Freedom Summer" in 1964 drew hundreds 
of mostly white college students from the North to help register black voters and kept 
the nation's attention focused on racial conditions in the South; and, when three of 
the volunteers-two white and one black-were murdered in Philadelphia, Mississippi, 
most Americans were stunned and outraged. 84 A huge Democratic landslide in 
November made the time seem propitious, and civil rights leaders seized the 
opportunity to press for further legislation. 85 A series of protests against voting 
discrimination in Selma, Alabama highlighted the issue's critical importance, and 
once again Southern police officers outraged the nation by responding with 
unprovoked violence and brutality against peaceful marchers. The combination of 
events led the Johnson administration and Congress to act once more. 
80. See generally John G. Stewart, When Democracy Worked, 59 N.Y.L. Scu. L. REv. 145 (2014-2015). 
81. See E.W. Kenworthy, Civil Rights Bill Passed, 73-27; johnson Urges All to Comply; Dirksen Berates 
Goldwater, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1964, at A1 ("Except for Senator Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, all 
the Democratic votes against the bill came from Southerners."), available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
learning/generallonthisday/big/0619.html#headlines. See generally THE C1v1L RIGHTS AcT OF 1964: 
THE PASSAGE OF THE LAw THAT ENDED RACIAL SEGREGATION (Robert D. Loevy ed., 1997); Tooo S. 
PuRDUM, AN IDEA WHosE TIME HAs CoME: Two PRESIDENTS, Two PARTIES, AND THE BATTLE FOR 
THE C1v1L RIGHTS AcT or 1964 (2014); CLAY RISEN, THE BILL OF THE CENTURY: THE EPIC BATTLE 
FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (2014). 
82. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 201-207, 78 Stat. at 243-45. 
83. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973gg-10 (2013)). 
84. Civil rights activists in Mississippi, after struggling for years against horrific violence to 
organize the state, decided to import hundreds of mostly white northern college 
students for a Freedom Summer of civil rights activity. They understood that bringing 
"outside agitators" to Mississippi would probably elicit a deadly response, and they 
calculated that the national media and the Johnson administration would lavish 
attention on relatively affluent whites from the nation's most prestigious universities. 
The strategy worked even more effectively and more tragically than they had 
anticipated. 
KLARMAN, supra note 61, at 439. 
85. See generally TAYLOR BRANCH, AT CANAAN's EDGE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1965-68 (2006) 
[hereinafter BRANCH, CANAAN's EDGE]. 
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The Voting Rights Act of1965, often considered "the single most effective piece of 
civil rights legislation ever passed by Congress," was vigorous and comprehensive. 86 It 
prohibited discrimination in voting, banned various "tests" and other restrictions on 
the right to vote, barred residency requirements of more than thirty days for voting in 
presidential elections, allowed special assistance for illiterate and disabled voters, and 
prohibited efforts to intimidate or harass those who went to the polls. Spurring far 
more extensive national enforcement efforts, moreover, it authorized federal examiners 
to supervise voting in certain districts, and it prohibited states and counties with 
histories of racial discrimination in voting from altering their voting laws without prior 
federal approval. In the decades following its passage, the act enabled millions of 
previously disenfranchised Americans, particularly blacks in the South, to vote. 87 
Reflecting the mood of the time, the federal government quickly moved into 
action. 88 The Justice Department became increasingly effective in using its new 
powers to protect civil rights, 89 while the Court acted with astonishing immediacy to 
reject constitutional challenges to both statutes. It took the Court only six months to 
uphold the 1964 act90 and only seven months to do the same with the 1965 act.91 In 
spite of obstacles, including the continued recalcitrance of some Southern federal 
judges, by the 1970s the two acts had brought major changes to the South and the 
nation as a whole.92 
86. Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Laws: The Effect of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP'T JusTICE (last 
revised June 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/intro/intro_c.php. 
87. See DAVID J. GARRow, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LuTHER KING, ]R., AND THE VoTING RIGHTS 
AcT OF 1965, at 31-132 (1978); MAY, supra note 55. 
88. [T]he most dramatic changes have occurred under the aegis of the VRA-through 
administrative implementation by state governments and the Department of Justice, 
dynamic Supreme Court constructions (typically driven by the department's suggestions), 
and congressional amendments expanding this law in light of experience and practice. 
Like the Civil Rights Act of1964, the VRA is a superstatute because it (1) was responsive 
to the new shape of America's pluralism and adopted new principles and new institutional 
frameworks to assure the franchise for newly significant social groups, (2) was drafted 
and enacted after a process of publicized institutional deliberation responsive to the voices 
and needs of We the People, and (3) was accepted by We the People and formally 
reaffirmed by Congress after a period of implementation and public discussion of the 
controversial new ideas advanced in the law or its implementation. 
WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE JR. & JoHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEw AMERICAN 
CoNSTITUTION 88 (2010). 
89. See BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE DISCRIMINATION AND THE DEPARTMENT 
OF JusTICE (1997). There were exceptions, however, and not all agencies of the federal government fell 
into line. See PETE DANIEL, DISPOSSESSION: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST AFRICAN AMERICAN FARMERS 
IN THE AGE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2013) (discussing certain policies at the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
that evidenced lingering racism in the bureaucracy). 
90. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 
294 (1964). 
91. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
92. 2 RAcE, VoTING, AND REDISTRICTING AND THE CoNSTITUTION: SouRcEs AND ExPLORATION oN THE 
fiFTEENTH AMENDMENT, ENFORCING AND CHALLENGING THE VOTING RIGHTS AcT OF 1965 (Marsha 
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B. Memory 
I had the good fortune to be in Washington in early June when the battle to pass 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 neared its climax, and I still remember the frenzied 
scene. For me, the high point came on the day when the Senate voted on the cloture 
petition that Democratic majority leader Mike Mansfield had at long last filed. 
Passage of the petition was essential to cut off a Southern filibuster and thereby 
ensure that the bill-which had already passed the House-could reach the Senate 
floor for a final vote. The bill unquestionably enjoyed majority support, but it was 
uncertain whether a cloture petition could command the necessary sixty-seven votes 
to end the filibuster.93 The South's desperate final effort to talk the bill to death had 
lasted fifty-seven days, consumed 534 hours of debate, filled 63,000 pages of the 
Congressional Record, and spewed out some ten million words.94 Topping the list of 
the bill's opponents, Democratic Senator Robert Byrd ofWest Virginia had spoken 
for fourteen hours and thirteen minutes before yielding the floor in exhaustion. It 
was at the time "the longest speech of the longest filibuster in Senate history."95 
I was traveling with a fellow graduate student from England, and we longed 
above all to see the action in the Senate on the day when the decisive cloture vote 
was scheduled. We were hardly alone in that goal. The area around the Capitol was 
packed as civil rights supporters, political observers, and reporters from across the 
globe joined the ordinary legions of summer tourists jamming sidewalks, halls, and 
offices. In the hope of somehow getting lucky, I led us to the office of my home-
state's senior senator, Stuart Symington, a liberal Democrat from Missouri who had 
served as secretary of the Air Force under President Truman. Symington's outer 
office was packed with visitors clamoring for attention, and harried staffers were 
scurrying about their tasks and trying to answer questions and respond to requests. 
The situation appeared chaotic, and our spirits sagged. Then, scanning the scene and 
Darling ed., 2001); GARROW, supra note 87, at 6-30, 179-211; MAY, supra note 55, at 171-254; SuSAN 
WRIGHT, THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964: LANDMARK ANTIDISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION 33-40 
(2006). 
93. To weaken the 1960 act "to the point of meaninglessness," Southern senators had filibustered, and the 
bill's supporters could not command the votes necessary to invoke cloture. More striking, civil rights 
supporters not only failed to pass the cloture petition, but they could not even gather a majority to 
support it. The vote to end debate produced only forty-two affirmative votes while drawing fifty-three 
negatives. CARO, :MASTER OF THE SENATE, supra note 62, at 1034. 
94. See CARO, PASSAGE OF PowER, supra note 62, at 568; TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN 
THE KING YEARS, 1963-65, at 336 &n.* (1998) [hereinafter BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE). Over the course 
of debate, Southern senators introduced 483 amendments and demanded roll-call votes on more than a 
hundred of them. They succeeded, however, in making only one significant change to the bill: 
expanding the right of defendants in criminal contempt cases to demand jury trials. Passage of Rights Bill 
Intact Surprises Congress, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1964. 
95. BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE, supra note 94, at 336. There have been a few individual filibusters that lasted 
longer than Byrd's, but no extended group filibuster that lasted longer than the one directed against the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. See, e.g., Aaron Blake, Where Ted Cruz's Marathon Speech Stands in History, 
WASH. PosT BLoG (Sept. 25, 2013, 12:27 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/ 
wp/2013/09/24/where-ted-cruzs-filibuster-stands-in-history/ (ranking Byrd's as the eighth longest 
filibuster in Senate history). 
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desperately trying to figure out our next move, I spotted one of the doors at the back 
of the office open and, hurrying through it, an old friend from college. "Buffie," I 
blurted out, calling loudly and waving frantically to catch her attention. Her name 
really was "Buffie." She saw me and immediately came toward us with a welcoming 
smile. We hugged and exchanged brief greetings, and I hastily introduced my friend 
and began explaining our plight. Buffie quickly nodded. "Wait right here." With 
that, she turned, flew across the outer office and into another room, and shortly 
reemerged with two pieces of paper in hand. "These are passes to the senators' private 
gallery, which is reserved for their special guests," she told us. "You can stay there 
today as long as you want." Astonished and delighted, we thanked her profusely. To 
this day my English friend never fails to feign awe at the "incredible influence" I 
wield in the nation's capital, while we both remain forever grateful to our happily 
remembered benefactress. 
Clutching our two precious passes, we rushed to the Senate chamber where we 
were promptly ushered into a private section of the gallery. The public galleries were 
packed with visitors who had to stand in long lines to get in, and their stays were 
being ruthlessly cut short at regular intervals as guards continuously led one group 
out and replaced it with another. As we entered, Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois, 
the Republican minority leader, was speaking in support of the petition. "We are 
confronted with a moral issue," he concluded in his familiar husky and resonant 
tones. "Today let us not be found wanting in whatever it takes by way of moral and 
spiritual substance to face up to the issue and to vote cloture."96 
Then, by prearranged rule, the Senate proceeded to the business that had finally 
been scheduled. As my friend and I sat transfixed, the clerk called the roll for a 
quorum, and the Senate floor began to fill and buzz as all one hundred senators 
came forward to answer. Twice the acting president ordered the sergeant at arms to 
clear everyone not privileged to be on the floor during the vote, and then he called 
the question. It was an extraordinary spectacle-not only were one hundred senators 
actually present on the floor at one time or another, but most seemed to remain there 
after voting, milling about and waiting anxiously to learn the petition's fate. Although 
its supporters had done their homework and believed that they would be able to 
96. 110 CoNG. REc. 13320 (June 10, 1964) (statement of Sen. Dirksen). Dirksen was the last senator to 
speak on the cloture petition before the vote. The fact that he enjoyed such a featured position was likely 
the result of advice that President Johnson had given to Democratic Senator Hubert Humphrey, the 
bill's floor leader. Johnson was determined to use every means possible to persuade Dirksen to vote for 
cloture and to use his inf1uence as minority leader to bring most Republicans-essential to reach the 
necessary sixty-seven votes-along with him. "You and I are going to get Ev," Johnson had told 
Humphrey, and he explained how it would be done. "You've got to let him have a piece of the action," he 
explained. "He's got to look good all the time." CARD, PAsSAGE OF PowER, supra note 62, at 564. As 
Robert A. Caro concluded, their "courtship of Dirksen had never stopped." Id. at 568. Although 
Johnson played a key role in the bill's passage, especially in the House, the shrewd and methodical 
efforts of both Humphrey and Dirksen were essential to its passage in the Senate. See, e.g., Stewart, 
supra note 80. 
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muster the necessary sixty-seven votes, growing tension and excitement filled the 
chamber as the roll call continued and the count slowly mounted. At last came the 
sixty-seventh vote in favor, cast by Senator John J. Williams, a Republican from 
Delaware. The bill was going to reach the Senate floor, and it would surely be 
passed.97 The final tally ended at 71-29, four votes more than was necessary.98 For 
millions, my friend and I included, the result was exhilaration, a broadly shared 
feeling of both vindication and joy.99 
Besides passage of the petition, the most memorable event of the day for me was 
the appearance on the floor of Senator Clair Engle, a Democrat from California. 
Elected to the Senate in the Democratic tide of 1958, Engle had developed a brain 
tumor that required him to undergo two operations. The result left him partially 
paralyzed, wheelchair-bound, and unable to speak. By late April of 1964, his hopes 
of recovery had vanished, and he announced that he was abandoning his planned 
reelection campaign. ~ite vividly I recall the sight of the crowded Senate floor, the 
drama of the ongoing roll call, and then the emotional impact of seeing a man in a 
wheelchair-there was no doubt who the slumped figure had to be-pushed onto 
the Senate floor where he gained recognition from the clerk and cast an inaudible 
"aye" vote in favor of cloture by feebly lifting his hand and pointing to his eye. After 
voting, he was quickly wheeled away and, on a minor procedural vote taken only a 
short time later that day, he did not reappear.100 The exhausting effort he had made 
to reach the Senate floor for that one decisive cloture vote was apparently all his 
failing body could manage. 
Engle's implacable determination to be counted on that momentous vote struck 
me then, as it does now, as symbolizing the passion and conviction that the civil 
rights movement inspired. Centuries of oppression and abuse had to be remedied, 
and the cause justly demanded the greatest possible effort. A little more than a month 
after the vote, Clair Engle died. He was only fifty-two years old.101 
97. For more on Senator Williams, see Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., The Role if the Leadership Conftrence on Civil 
Rights in the Civil Rights Struggle o/1963-1964, in THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964: THE PASSAGE OF 
THE LAw THAT ENDED RACIAL SEGREGATION, supra note 81, at 49, 74. 
98. The final vote on cloture appears at 110 CoNG. REc. 13327 (June 10, 1964). Forty-four Democrats 
joined twenty-seven Republicans to adopt the petition, while twenty-three Democrats and six 
Republicans (including the party's future presidential nominee, Barry Goldwater) voted nay. CARD, 
PASSAGE OF POWER, supra note 62, at 568. 
99. Addressing a related matter shortly after the cloture vote, Democratic Senator Richard Russell of 
Georgia, the leader of the Southern bloc, protested in words that revealed not only the bitterness and 
intransigence of the opposition, but also the racial cruelty that marked their rhetoric and attitudes. "Mr. 
President, we are confronted with the spirit of not only the mob but of a lynch mob in the Senate of the 
United States." 110 CoNG. REc. 13329 (June 10, 1964). 
lOO.Jd. 
101. Senator Clair Engle of California Dies, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1964, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/1964/07/31/senator-clair-engle-of-california-dies.html. 
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IV. FIFTY YEARS LATER 
A. The Fading of the Civil Rights Movement 
If passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 represented the peak of the civil 
rights movement, the same year also marked the beginning of its decline.102 While 
more victories followed in the late 1960s and into the 1970s,103 the Movement 
increasingly ran into heavy obstacles, some internal and more external. 
Internally, divisions sharpened and momentum began to dissipate. The emergence 
of a "black power" movement encouraged more radical actions and rhetoric, alienating 
many supporters, both black and white.104 Interviewing blacks in several northern 
cities in 1967, for example, Garry Wills was struck by the new attitudes he found. 
Marches were out of date and merely "nostalgic," one black man in Detroit told him. 
"Don't you understand?-black people are looking for confrontations."105 The next 
year Wills published his findings under the title of The Second Civil War, a book with 
the dispiriting subtitle Arming for Armageddon. Two years later, Alexander Bickel-
who had been a firm supporter of the Supreme Court's desegregation decisions-charged 
that Brown's ideal of an "egalitarian and assimilationist" school system was becoming 
"increasingly illusory and myth-ridden." Many blacks, he had come to believe, were 
now "more intent on group autonomy than on individual equality."106 
Equally important, King further fragmented and blunted the Movement with 
two critical decisions: First, he decided on moral grounds to oppose the war in 
Vietnam and broke openly on the issue with President Johnson and much of the 
Democratic Party. Second, he decided to turn the Movement northward and attack 
problems of black unemployment and urban poverty.107 The former decision alienated 
102. See generally ]AMES T. PATTERSON, THE EvE OF DESTRUCTION: How 1965 TRANSFORMED AMERICA 
(2012). The historical period subsequently labeled "the Sixties" had several stages. See Edward A. 
Purcell, Jr., Social Thought, 35 AM. Q 80, 82-83 (1983). The civil rights movement inspired and 
dominated the period's first half, but after 1965 it was increasingly overshadowed by protests against the 
war in Vietnam and more radical new social and cultural movements, including varieties of "black 
power," that challenged established ideas and authority more widely and fundamentally. See id. at 83, 
86; PATTERSON, supra, at xiii. 
103. In 1968, for example, Congress passed the Fair Housing Act, the last of the decade's three great civil 
rights statutes, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 801, 82 Stat. 73, 81 (1968). In numerous decisions into the 1970s 
and even early 1980s, the Court construed the Constitution and statutes with the goal of effectively 
protecting the rights of minorities and enforcing the law's guarantees of equal protection. See, e.g., THE 
BuRGER CouRT: THE CouNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WAsN'T (Vincent Blasi eel., 1983); MoRTON J. 
HoRwiTZ, THE WARREN CouRT AND THE PuRSUIT oF JusTicE (1998); THE BuRGER CouRT: PoLITICAL 
AND JuDICIAL PROFILES (Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern eds., 1991); LucAs A. PowE, ]R., 
THE WARREN CouRT AND AMERICAN PoLITICS (2000); THE WARREN CouRT: A RETROSPECTIVE 
(Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996). For a contemporary evaluation of progress, see SAR A. LEVITAN ET AL., 
STILL A DREAM: THE CHANGING STATUS OF BLACKS SINCE 1960 (1975). 
104. For King's views on "black power," see KING, AuTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 30, at 314-32. 
105. WILLS, supra note 68, at 159. 
106. ALEXANDER M. BicKEL, THE SuPREME CouRT AND THE IDEA oF PROGRESS 138, 139 (1970). 
107. In the years after 1965, King moved his efforts increasingly to the North and to economic issues and 
concerns over urban poverty and employment discrimination. He pushed "Operation Breadbasket" in 
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supporters who backed the war or were determined to remain loyal to Johnson, while 
the latter forced the Movement to confront the morally more ambiguous and 
practically more complex problems presented by seemingly unshakeable economic 
interests and deeply entrenched systems of informal social segregation.108 
Externally, urban rioting, the war in Vietnam and its steadily mounting costs, 
and the explosion of other "radical" and divisive social and cultural movements 
combined to drain the Movement's support and spur a sharpening white backlash.109 
Then came the assassinations. King was murdered in April1968, and two months 
later Robert F. Kennedy met the same fate. Those twin blows deprived the Movement 
of both its most charismatic and compelling leader and the passionate new presidential 
candidate who had most aroused the hopes of blacks and other civil rights supporters. 
At the end of the year, the election of Richard M. Nixon marked a turning point, 
and a subsequent series of crises both domestic and foreign helped push the nation 
ever politically rightward. Battles over "affirmative action" proved especially 
disheartening, dividing civil rights supporters and provoking even more determined 
and bitter opposition from others.U0 Although the Court held out for some time, it 
too eventually succumbed. By the 1980s, Republican presidents had succeeded in 
placing on the Court a majority of justices who shared-and were willing to 
Chicago and elsewhere on the premise that: 
[A]ny company doing business in the ghetto must radically reconstruct its employment 
practices commensurate with the profits which it is taking out of the community. For 
any company to receive sizeable profits from the Negro Community while employing 
only a small number of community residents, and thus reinvesting only a small 
percentage of its profits back into the community is one of the factors which creates a 
slum. These practices are exploitative, unjust, and immoral. 
Press Release, Operation Breadbasket: A Statement by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., at 2 (Dec. 12, 1967), 
available at http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document/operation-breadbasket-statement-dr-martin-
luther-king-jr; see also GoRDON K. MANTLER, PowER To THE PooR: BLACK-BROWN CoALITION & THE 
FIGHT FOR EcoNOMIC JusTICE, 1960-1974, at 90-120 (2013); KING, AuTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 30, at 
297-313, 346-55. 
l 08. Hannah Arendt was among the commentators who concluded that civil rights activists encountered a 
stone wall when they shifted their attention to the North and to issues of economic inequality. "Then 
they collided with the enormous social needs of the city ghettos in the North-and there they came to 
grief, there they could accomplish nothing." ARENDT, supra note 66, at 70; see also CHICAGO 1966: OPEN 
HouSING MARCHES, SuMMIT NEGOTIATIONS, AND OPERATION BREADBASKET (David J. Garrow eel., 
1989); BRANCH, CANAAN's EDGE, supra note 85. But see MANTLER, supra note 107 (arguing that King's 
"Poor People's Campaign" led to some successful political consequences). 
109. See, e.g., PETER N. CARROLL, h SEEMED LIKE NoTHING HAPPENED: THE TRAGEDY AND PROMISE OF 
AMERICA IN THE 1970s (1982); WALTER DAviD GREASON, SuBURBAN ERASURE: How THE SuBURBS 
ENDED THE CIVIL RIGHTS MovEMENT IN NEw JERSEY (2013); DEAN J. KoTLOWSKI, NixoN's CiviL 
RIGHTS: PoLITics, PRINCIPLEs, AND PoLicY (2001); }AMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND ExPECTATIONs: 
THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1974, at 593-790 (1996); }AMES T. PATTERSON, REsTLESS GIANT: THE 
UNITED STATES FROM WATERGATE TO BusH v. GoRE 13-192 (2005). 
ll 0. See DENNIS DESLIPPE, PROTESTING AFFIRMATIVE AcTION: THE STRUGGLE OvER EQuALITY AFTER 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2012). 
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implement-the party's post-Nixonian ideological convictions, including its hostility 
toward civil rights.m 
In spite of setbacks, civil rights groups continued their activities and fought 
vigorously against the rightward drift. Occasionally they were able to slow its 
momentum.112 However, sometime between the late 1960s and the early 1980s, what 
had been hailed as "The Civil Rights Movement"-the vibrant, aggressive, and 
galvanizing Movement that the March on Washington and the "I Have a Dream" 
speech symbolized-lost its momentum and then faded away.113 
B. An Altered America 
Today, a half century after the March and the "I Have a Dream" speech, 
American society and politics look considerably different. Two general observations 
seem warranted: One is that the nation has made substantial progress in honoring 
the civil rights of all Americans and in improving its treatment of black Americans. 
The other is that the progress is limited, and worse, that signs of regression are 
apparentY4 
Perhaps most centrally, the half century after 1963 witnessed the formation of a 
new American politics of race and class. Through the 1950s and into the 1960s, racist 
language, appeals, and actions still remained relatively common.115 The civil rights 
movement helped reduce such overt racism and, for the most part, banished explicitly 
racist language and arguments from the public sphere. Over the decades, political, 
111. See, e.g., THOMAS M. KEcK, THE MosT AcTIVIST SuPREME CouRT IN HISTORY: THE RoAD TO 
MoDERN JuDICIAL CoNSERVATISM (2004); RoBERT MAsoN, RICHARD NixON AND THE QyEsT FOR A 
NEw MAJORITY (2004). On the Court's changing view of affirmative action, see Thomas M. Keck, 
From Bakke to Gruner: The Rise of Rights-Based Conservatism, in THE SuPREME CouRT & AMERICAN 
PoLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 414-42 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006). 
112. ln 1991, for example, civil rights supporters were able to pass an act responding to a series of Court 
decisions that had given particularly narrow constructions to various provisions of the civil rights laws. 
Civil Rights Act of1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,105 Stat. 1071 (1991). See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, The 
Civil Rights Act of1991: A Brief Introductmy Analysis of the Congressional Response to judicia/Interpretation, 
68 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 923 (1993). 
113. See, e.g., Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past, 91 J. 
AM. I-liST. 1233 (2005). 
114. For assessments stressing the extent to which the nation fell short of achieving the goal of racial justice 
and equality, see JoE R. FEAGIN & MELVIN P. SIKES, LIVING WITH RACISM: THE BLACK MIDDLE-
CLASS ExPERIENCE (1994); PETER IRONS, jiM CRaw's CHILDREN: THE BROKEN PROMISE OF THE 
BROWN DECISION (2002); AwAKENING FRoM THE DREAM: CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER SIEGE AND THE NEw 
STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL JusTICE (Denise C. Morgan et al. eds., 2006); KLINKNER & SMITH, supra note 3, 
at 317-51. 
115. Examples abound. See, e.g., supra note 52; BoRSTELMANN, supra note 66, at 4-5; ]AMES JACKSON 
KILPATRICK, THE SovEREIGN STATES: NoTES OF A CITIZEN OF VIRGINIA 279 (1957); see also jAMES 
JACKSON KILPATRICK, THE SouTHERN CASE FOR ScHOOL SEGREGATION 27, 35-36 (1962). See generally 
WILLIAM P. 1-IusTWIT, JAMES J. KILPATRICK: SALESMAN FOR SEGREGATION (2013). More commonly, 
of course, Southerners and opponents of civil rights draped their public opposition to black civil rights 
in the language of states' rights, federalism, and anti-communism. See, e.g., HERMAN E. TALMADGE, 
You AND SEGREGATION (1955). 
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social, cultural, and economic changes gradually altered the views of many white 
Americans. Some embraced the ideal of racial equality, and others at least accepted 
the ideal's consequences in the nation's public practices. Some remained untouched. 
The racial prejudices that remained mostly went underground and often melded 
into other, more general social and political views that offered alternative public 
grounds for opposing the cause of black civil rights. That melding process was 
encouraged by the birth in the late 1960s of a new and more subtle political rhetoric 
that used code words and categories that were not explicitly racial, but that 
nevertheless carried well-understood racial messages. Embracing a "Southern 
Strategy," Nixon attacked the Warren Court by invoking the threat of lawlessness 
and proclaiming his commitment to "law and order"-themes that played to white 
fears of black radicalism and criminality.U6 Ronald Reagan, who had opposed both 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, sent unmistakable 
signals to both whites and blacks, stirring racial passions with praise for "states' 
rights" and denunciations of "welfare queens." More baldly, he staged presidential 
campaign rallies in Philadelphia, Mississippi-unknown to the nation except as the 
location where three civil rights workers were infamously murdered in 1964-and 
Stone Mountain, Georgia-a shrine to the Confederacy, a traditional site of Ku 
Klux Klan rallies, and the symbol of Southern racism that King had specifically 
invoked in the peroration of his "I Have a Dream" speech.117 Just as obviously, George 
H.W. Bush played on racist assumptions and fears in 1988 by using the notorious 
"Willie Horton" campaign advertisement to imply that his Democratic opponent 
was freeing convicted black murderers from prison so they could prey on helpless, 
law-abiding Americans.U8 
116. See}AMES F. SIMON, IN His OwN IMAGE: THE SuPREME CouRT IN RicHARD NixoN's AMERICA (1973). 
117. TovA ANDREA WANG, THE PoLITics oF VoTER SuPPRESSION: DEFENDING AND ExPANDING 
AMERICANS' RIGHT TO VoTE 53 (2012). In 2004, Roger Wilkins, who had been one of the leaders of 
the March on Washington and was then a professor of history at George Mason University, summed up 
perceptions of Reagan's efforts in an oral interview: 
Reagan was an incredible combination of a person who was very optimistic, upbeat, but 
underneath there were some really ugly parts of his politics .... [H]e capitalized on 
anti-black populism by going to Philadelphia ... [in] Mississippi, for example, in the 
beginning of his campaign in 1980. Nobody had ever heard of Philadelphia ... [in] 
Mississippi outside of Mississippi, except as the place where three civil rights workers 
had been lynched-in 1964-he said I believe in states rights. Everybody knew what 
that meant. He went to Stone Mountain, Georgia, where the Ku Klux Klan used to 
burn its crosses, and he said Jefferson Davis is a hero of mine. 
And the impact of that plus his attacks on welfare women, welfare queens in Cadillacs, 
for example. And his call for cutting the government. He didn't cut the government; 
the military bloomed in his time. But programs for poor people ... diminished entirely 
and America became a less civilized and less decent place. 
PBS, Historians Discuss Reagan's Legacy, PBS NEwsHouR (June 7, 2004), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/ 
bb/remember-jan-june04-historians_06-07/. 
118. See, e.g., David A. Lowe, The Willie Horton Ad Revisited 25 Years Later, GRIO (Oct. 21, 2013, 10:33 
AM), http:l/thegrio.com/2013/10/21/the-willie-horton-ad-revisited-25-years-later/. 
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Bush's top political strategist, Lee Atwater, privately acknowledged the evolution 
of the party's rhetoric dealing with racial issues, and he explained it in the bluntest of 
terms: 
You start out in 1954 by saying, "Nigger, nigger, nigger." By 1968 you can't 
say "nigger"-that hurts you, backfires. So you say stuff like, uh, "forced 
busing," "states' rights," and all that stuff, and you're getting so abstract. Now, 
you're talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you're talking about 
are totally economic things and a byproduct of them is, blacks get hurt worse 
than whites .... "We want to cut this" is much more abstract than even the 
busing thing, uh, and a hell of a lot more abstract than "Nigger, nigger."119 
Atwater's statement did far more than trace the evolution of Republican rhetoric 
dealing with race, for it also captured the party's renewed emphasis on certain kinds 
of economic policies, especially tax cuts for the wealthy and limitations on federal 
social programs. "The Reagan Revolution, as I had defined it, required a frontal 
assault on the American welfare state," David Stockman, Reagan's first budget 
director, explained. "That was the only way to pay for the massive Kemp-Roth tax 
cut."12° Consistent with the new rhetoric of race and class, those economic policies 
carried not only economic but also racial significance. As three political scientists 
concluded in 2002, "[T]he language of government spending and taxation has 
become racially 'coded,' such that its invocation in political appeals primes racial 
considerations even in the absence of racial imagery."121 
The Republican commitment to tax cuts and restrictions on welfare programs 
encouraged the party's increasingly fervent embrace of political and economic policies 
that were consistent with, and could be justified by, sweeping and abstract claims 
about the benevolent operations of "the market."122 Republican market ideologies 
119. JoNATHAN At.TER, THE CENTER HoLDS: OsAMA AND Hts ENEMIES 42 (2013) (alteration in original). 
After learning he had a severe brain tumor in 1990, and before his death the following year, Atwater 
acknowledged the ugly nature of his campaign tactics and apologized for them. See Gravely Ill, Atwater 
Offen Apology, N.Y. TtMES, Jan. 13, 1991, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/13/us/gravely-
ill-atwater-offers-apology.html. 
120. DAviD A. SToCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF Pouncs: THE INSIDE STORY oF THE REAGAN REVOLUTION 8 
(1986). 
121. Nicholas A. Valentino et a!., Cues that Matter: How Political Ads Prime Racial Attitudes During 
Campaigns, 96 AM. PoL. Set. REv. 75, 87 (2002). Accord THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, 
CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT oF RAcE, RtGHTS, AND TAxEs ON AMERICAN PoLITics (1991). 
Political scientists have explored whether implicit or explicit racial appeals are more effective in politics, 
and they have reached conflicting conclusions. Their findings are consistent, however, in showing that 
race and racial messaging, regardless of their form, remain significant factors in American politics. 
Compare, e.g., TALI MENDELBERG, THE RACE CARD: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY, IMPLICIT l'vlEssAGES, AND 
THE NoRM OF EQUALITY (2001) (arguing that implicit racial messages are more effective in encouraging 
racialized politics), with Gregory A. Huber & John S. Lapinski, Testing the Implicit-Explicit Model of 
Racialized Political Communication, 6 PERSP. ON PoL. 125 (2008) (challenging the claim that implicit 
racial messages are more effective than explicit ones). 
122. It is essential to note that Republican "market" ideologies are quite different from genuine economic 
theories of market behavior. The former are sweeping, abstract, absolute, and designed for partisan 
political purposes. The latter are varied, cautious, limited, and often highly qualified. As opposed to 
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were malleable formations used to rationalize and meld a range of partisan interests, 
beliefs, and values. Although their market ideologies could appeal to voters on a 
variety of grounds independent of racial motivations and prejudices, they nonetheless 
in practice brought predictable and well-understood social and racial consequences. 
Restrictions on federal social programs and deep tax cuts favoring the wealthy 
worked against tens of millions of ordinary Americans, including millions of whites, 
but they also worked disproportionally against blacks and other socially disadvantaged 
minorities.123 From the perspective of those who truly believed in such market 
ideologies, those disparate results were simply unintended and incidental consequences 
of wise economic policy.124 
Ultimately, Atwater's statement anticipated the political world of the present 
where market ideologies shape the debate over the economic issues that dominate 
public discourse, while racial messages and prejudices remain muted or masked.125 
Republicans proclaim the virtues of an ostensibly "free" market, the necessity of 
encouraging business and the wealthy with tax breaks and other favorable policies, 
and the evil consequences that necessarily follow from government economic 
regulation and social welfare programs. Wealth and success are emblems of virtue 
and hard work, they believe, while poverty and unemployment are the fault of the 
poor and unemployed, the result of their own lazy, incompetent, undisciplined, and 
often immoral behavior. Thus, their market ideologies lead many Republicans to 
understand economic inequality as benevolent and desirable while convincing them 
that racial discrimination is insignificant, non-existent, irrelevant, or simply 
unavoidable.126 As a result, public policies increasingly favor the wealthy, economic 
market ideologies, serious economic theories of markets recognize the role and importance of such 
factors as the social and cultural construction of markets, the sharply bounded scope of "rational'' 
economic behavior, the shaping and limiting impact of existing institutions on market behavior, and the 
pervasive nature and wide variety of market imperfections and failures that mark the real world. See, e.g., 
ALAN S. BLINDER, HARD HEADS, SoFT HEARTS: TouGH-MINDED EcoNOMics FOR A juST SociETY 
(1987); ]Acos S. HAcKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE NEw EcoNOMIC INSECURITY AND THE 
DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (2008) [hereinafter HACKER, RISK SHIFT]; ALBERT 0. 
HIRSCHMAN, THE PAsSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: PoLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE 
ITs TRIUMPH (1977); PAuL KRUGMAN, THE GREAT UNRAVELING: LosiNG OuR WAY IN THE NEw 
CENTURY (2003); JosEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE oF INEQUALITY (2012). 
123. The "war on poverty" that raised federal spending prior to the Reagan presidency had originally been 
designed primarily tO assist poor whites-not blacks. }AMES T. PATTERSON, AMERICA'S STRUGGLE 
AGAINST PovERTY, 1900-1980, at 134-35 (1981). 
124. On increasing income inequality during and after the 1980s, and the relatively disadvantaged position 
of blacks, see, e.g., Maury Gittleman & Edward N. Wolff, Racial Difjfnnces in Patterns qf Wealth 
Accumulation, 39]. HuM. RESOURCES 193 (2004); Edward N. Wolff, Trends in Household Wealth in the 
United States, 1962-83 and 1983-89, 40 REv. INCOME & WEALTH 143 (1994). 
125. For the continued, and likely growing, impact of racial prejudice and resentments in American politics, 
see infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text. 
126. "Constitutional interpretation involves judicial discretion; judicial discretion reflects political ideology; 
and conservative justices tend, unsurprisingly, to subscribe to the conservative racial ideology of the 
party that appointed them." lVIARCIA CoYLE, THE RoBERTS CouRT: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE 
CoNSTITUTION 46 (2013) (quoting Klarman). "That ideology embraces a narrow, formalist conception 
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inequality grows steadily, and blacks and other minorities continue to come out on 
the short end.127 
In the days after the March and the Speech, the Republican Party had 
overwhelmingly joined the effort to force cloture on the Senate and secure passage of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and its senators and representatives had generally lined 
up solidly behind both the 1964 and 1965 Civil Rights Acts. Unlike the civil rights 
movement, that party had not simply faded away. Rather, it had been methodically 
reoriented and, in many ways, shifted into reverse.128 
C. An Altered Supreme Court 
Those market ideologies and the new politics of race and class transformed the 
Court. As it fell under the domination of an activist and conservative Republican 
majority, it began reshaping the law and the Constitution in line with the party's 
ideological convictions. Supporting the interests ofbusiness and organized wealth, it 
increasingly disfavored a variety of other social groups, including workers, consumers, 
tort victims, environmentalists, antitrust and securities law claimants, and those 
seeking relief under the civil rights laws.129 
of what counts as race discrimination; abhors the use of racial preferences, whether benignly motivated 
or not; and deems this nation's ugly history of white supremacy as something more to be repudiated than 
remedied." !d. (quoting Klarman). 
127. See, e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE PoLITICAL EcoNOMY OF THE NEw GILDED 
AGE (2008); David Callahan & J. Mijin Cha, Stacked Deck: How the Dominance of Politics by the Affluent 
& Business Undermines Economic Mobility in America, DEMOS, http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/ 
publications/Demos-Stacked-Deck. pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2015); MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND 
INFLUENCE: EcoNOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL PowER IN AMERICA (2012); ]Acon S. HACKER & 
PAuL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL PoLITics: How WAsHINGTON MADE THE RicH RicHER-AND 
TuRNED lTs BAcK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS (2010); KAY LEHMAN ScHLOZMAN ET AL., THE UNHEAVENLY 
CHoRus: UNEQUAL PoLITICAL VoiCE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2012); 
SuzANNE METTLER, DEGREES oF INEQUALITY: How THE PoLITICS oF HIGHER EDuCATION 
SABOTAGED THE AMERICAN DREAM (2014); Benjamin l. Page et al., Democracy and the Policy Preferences 
q(WealthyAmericans, 11 PERSP. ON PoL. 51 (2013); HACKER, RISK SHIFT, supra note 122. 
128. For the evolution of the Republican party and its ideology since the 1960s, see, e.g., JosEPH CRESPI NO, 
IN SEARCH oF ANOTHER CouNTRY: MISSISSIPPI AND THE CoNSERVATIVE CouNTERREVOLUTION 
(2007); JosEPH CRESPI NO, STROM THURMOND's AMERICA (2012); GEOFFREY KABASERVICE, RuLE AND 
RuiN: THE DowNFALL OF MoDERATION AND THE DEsTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, FROM 
EISENHOWER TO THE TEA PARTY (2012); JosEPH E. LowNDES, FROM THE NEw DEAL TO THE NEw 
RIGHT: RAcE AND THE SouTHERN ORIGINS oF MoDERN CoNSERVATISM (2008); RoBERT 0. SELF, ALL 
IN THE FAMILY: THE REALIGNMENT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY SINCE THE 1960s (2012); ROBERT 0. 
SELF, AMERICAN BABYLON: RAcE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR PosTwAR OAKLAND (2003); TIMOTHY N. 
THURBER, REPUBLICANS AND RAcE: THE GOP's FRAYED RELATIONSHIP wiTH AFRICAN AMERICANS, 
1945-1974 (2013); WINNING WHILE LosiNG: CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CoNSERVATIVE MovEMENT, AND 
THE PRESIDENCY FROM NIXON TO 0BAMA (Kenneth Osgood & Derrick E. White eds., 2014). 
129. See, e.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., From the Particular to the General: Three Federal Rules and the jurisprudence 
if the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, 162 U. PA. L. REv. 1731 (2014); see supra sources cited note 111. 
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The institutional change started with the election of Nixon in 1968 and his 
subsequent appointment of four Supreme Court justices.U0 William Rehnquist, 
serving under Nixon as assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Counsel, 
explained the significance of the new president's declared intention to appoint "strict 
constructionists" to the federal courts. ''A judge who is a 'strict constructionist' in 
constitutional matters," Rehnquist wrote when advising Nixon on judicial 
nominations, "will generally not be favorably inclined toward claims of either 
criminal defendants or civil rights plaintiffs."131 Rehnquist's characterization, White 
House Counsel John Dean noted, represented "a very accurate description of what 
Nixon wanted" in his judicial appointees.132 
Rehnquist's advice aptly captured the administration's politics and ideological 
orientation. The concern with "criminal defendants" reflected the new rhetoric of 
non-racial categories that nonetheless carried racial significance for many Americans, 
while his reference to "civil rights plaintiffs" was overt in its political implications, 
though also framed in a formally non-racial category.133 More revealing was the fact 
that his statement essentially equated the profoundly different claims of criminal 
defendants and civil rights plaintiffs. Formal legal arguments based on principles of 
130. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 116. "Supreme Court decisions are already reversing all the civil rights 
legislation. It's going to be harder for you to prove discrimination. Everything is being turned around." 
FEAGIN & SIKES, supra note 114, at 323. 
131. JoHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE NIXON APPOINTMENT THAT 
REDEFINED THE SuPREME CouRT 16 (2001). Suggesting the political resonance of those formal 
constitutional labels, James Jackson Kilpatrick, an overt racist dedicated to defending legalized 
segregation and "states' rights," used the contrary phrase "broad constructionists" to refer to those who 
supported Brown and thereby "obliterated" the constitutional "rights and powers of the States." 
KILPATRICK, THE SovEREIGN STATES, supra note 115, at x. 
132. DEAN, supra note 131, at 16. In 1971, after Justices Hugo Black and John Marshall Harlan announced 
their retirements, Nixon considered proposing a nominee who immediately drew sharp criticism from 
civil rights advocates. Angered by the negative reaction, Nixon told H.R. Haldeman, his White House 
Chief of Staff, that as a result he was "going to go for a real Right-Winger" on civil rights and "really 
stick it to the opposition." Shortly thereafter, Nixon "came up with the idea of nominating [Senator 
Robert] Byrd of West Virginia" because, among other qualities, "he was a former Ku Klux Klaner" and 
was "more reactionary than [Governor George] Wallace." Diary Entry, Oct. 2, 1971, H.R. Haldeman 
Diaries Collection (on file with the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, 
California). Nixon later suggested to another aide that he had not meant his statement about Byrd to be 
taken seriously and that its purpose "was to scare the hell out of the liberals" so that they would be 
relieved "when we appointed somebody that was not a member of the Ku Klux Klan." Jill Lapore, The 
Great Paper Caper, NEw YoRKER, Dec. 1, 2014, at 32, 35. Nixon subsequently nominated Rehnquist 
himself for a place on the Court, and civil rights supporters attacked Rehnquist sharply for a memo he 
had written in 1952 as law clerk to Justice Robert Jackson when the Court was considering the issue of 
school desegregation. Rehnquist's memo stated that Plessy v. Ferguson "was right and should be 
reaffirmed." /d. at 35. When the Senate finally confirmed Rehnquist's nomination over the opposition, 
Nixon called the new justice to congratulate him and to urge him to live up to his reputation: "Be as 
mean and rough as they said you were, Okay?" /d. at 36. 
133. Rehnquist himself had a notably dubious history in dealing with blacks and their civil rights. See, e.g., 
DAviD G. SAVAGE, TuRNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SuPREME CouRT 35-38 (1992); 
TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, THE REHNQUIST CouRT AND THE CoNSTITUTION 7-8 (2000); WANG, supra 
note 117, at 45-49. 
45 
REFLECTIONS ON THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MARCH AND THE SPEECH 
federalism, narrow construction of the Bill of Rights, or constraints on the 
incorporation doctrine could explain why a "strict constructionist" would disfavor 
the claims of criminal defendants, but those doctrines should hardly undermine the 
claims of civil rights plaintiffs. Unlike the former, the latter were acting under federal 
civil rights statutes and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments-constitutional 
provisions that explicitly and directly bound the states. The Court had clearly and 
firmly upheld those statutes, while the two constitutional amendments properly 
trumped federalism principles.134 Thus, it was not the Constitution that required 
either Rehnquist's equation of the legal rights of criminal defendants with those of 
civil rights plaintiffs or Nixon's agreement with that equation. It was politics and the 
emerging ideology of the Republican Party-the ideology that would come to 
dominate the Court after Reagan's election in 1980. 
Innumerable cases illustrate the ideological perspective of the conservative 
justices, but as a symbol of their goals and values, on the fiftieth anniversary of the 
March and the Speech, one decision towers above the rest. In the golden anniversary 
year of 2013, the five Republican conservatives on the Court joined to invalidate a 
critical provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, thereby negating one of the civil 
rights movement's most valuable and commanding legal achievements.135 
Shelby County v. Holder136 involved a challenge to the constitutionality of§§ 4(b) 
and 5 of the Voting Rights Act of1965. Section 4(b) established a formula to identify 
"covered jurisdictions": states or political subdivisions with a history of using racially 
discriminatory devices to limit voting. Section 5 established a "preclearance" 
requirement, providing that no "covered jurisdiction" could change its voting laws 
without prior approval from the U.S. Attorney General or a special three-judge 
federal court.137 Shelby County in Alabama, a "covered jurisdiction," sued to have 
both provisions declared unconstitutional. The lower courts rejected the challenge, 
but the five conservative Republicans on the Court reversed. 
Relying on the "principle that all States enjoy equal sovereignty,"138 the five-justice 
majority ruled that Congress could not limit the power of "covered jurisdictions" to 
regulate voting absent "a coverage formula grounded in current conditions."139 The 
134. See., e.g., cases cited supra notes 90-91. For the indeterminate, plastic, and manipulable nature of 
constitutional "federalism" and its "principles," see PuRCELL, supra note 50. 
135. The Court's decision on the Voting Rights Act of 1965 is merely one decision in a long and continuing 
line of socially similar decisions. Across a wide range of substantive issues-from arcane matters of 
jurisdiction and procedure to the construction of federal statutes and the interpretation of the 
Constitution-the Court under Chief Justices Rehnquist and Roberts has consistently issued decisions 
reflecting the ideology of the contemporary Republican Party and its hostility to civil rights. Purcell, 
supra note 129. 
136. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). For a vigorous defense of the Court's decision by two of the attorneys who 
represented Shelby County, see William S. Consovoy & Thomas R. McCarthy, Shelby County v. 
Holder: The Restoration of Constitutional Order; CATO SuP. CT. REv., 2012-2013, at 31. 
137. 133 S. Ct. at 2619-20. 
138. ld. at 2618. The majority repeatedly invoked this principle. See id. at 2621-24, 2630. 
139. !d. at 2629. 
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formula Congress used in § 4(b) was based on out-of-date information, they stated, 
and the legislative record it compiled lacked evidence of"current" racial discrimination 
in voting. Congress "cannot rely simply on the past."140 On that ground, they ruled 
§ 4(b) unconstitutional and suggested implicitly that § 5 might properly deserve the 
same fate.141 
Shelby County exemplifies the conservative majority's ideologically-driven 
decisionmaking. First, the five conservative justices invalidated the provision even 
though they acknowledged that "improvements" in eliminating racial discrimination 
"are in large part because of the Voting Rights Act." More telling, they also 
acknowledged that there was a continuing problem and that "voting discrimination 
still exists." Indeed, they admitted with surprising candor, "no one doubts that."142 
Second, the five conservative justices discounted the substantial "current" 
evidence that Congress had collected to support the act's reauthorization.143 That 
evidence showed that many states and localities in covered jurisdictions had repeatedly 
proposed changes in their voting laws, that those changes would likely produce 
racially discriminatory results, and that it was federal supervision-exercised or 
merely threatened-that had consistently blocked their efforts.144 Further, the five 
justices dismissed out of hand the likelihood-amply supported by the record-that 
invalidating the act would encourage more efforts by "covered jurisdictions" to enact 
new voting schemes that would, in practice, be racially discriminatory.145 
140. Id. 
141. The majority expressly left open the question of the constitutionality of§ 5, id. at 2631, but in a sole 
concurrence, Justice Thomas, who joined the majority opinion, maintained that the opinion's reasoning 
meant that§ 5 was also unconstitutional and that the majority had merely left that "inevitable conclusion 
unstated." I d. at 2632 (Thomas, J ., concurring). 
142. !d. at 2619, 2626. 
143. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's dissent, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan, and Sonia 
Sotomayor, highlights many of the more salient parts of the record. Id. at 2639-44. The majority, 
Ginsburg noted, "does not even deign to grapple with the legislative record." I d. at 2644. 
144. See id. at 2639-44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg also noted additional evidence of racially 
discriminatory actions in Alabama, the "covered jurisdiction" at issue in the case. !d. at 2646-47. 
145. The majority dismissed this "deterrent" argument on the ground that it would make the challenged 
provision "effectively immune from scrutiny." Id. at 2627. In doing so, the five conservative justices 
ignored the evidence in the record showing that "covered jurisdictions" had repeatedly attempted to 
enact discriminatory voting laws and had been consistently blocked by the statute's pre-clearance 
provision. Id. at 2639-40 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Attempting to check the innumerable kinds of 
devices that could be used to suppress voting "resembled battling the Hydra," Justice Ginsburg noted in 
dissent. "Whenever one form of voting discrimination was identified and prohibited, others sprang up 
in its place." Over the years, the Court had "repeatedly encountered the remarkable variety and 
persistence of laws disenfranchising minority citizens." ld. at 2633 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Ginsburg's Hydra image was entirely apt. In 2014, for example, a local 
election board in North Carolina-previously a covered jurisdiction and currently a potential swing 
state of immense importance in national elections-proposed to consolidate five heavily black voting 
precincts into two, a change that would make voting more inconvenient for many black voters. "We 
know," declared the president of the local NAACP chapter, "that this is part of a bigger trend-a 
movement to suppress people's right to vote." Richard Fausset, Mistrust in North Carolina Over Plan to 
Reduce Precincts, N.Y. TtMES, July 8, 2014, at A9. 
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Third, to justify both discounting the evidence in the record and requiring that 
Congress produce more "current" evidence, the five conservatives had to come up 
with some relatively demanding constitutional standard by which to void the 
provision. Though they cited precedents that called for the application of a "rational 
basis" test, and at times spoke as though they were applying such a test, 146 they did 
not do so-and for good reason. Under a fairly applied rational basis test, both 
sections of the Voting Rights Act were unquestionably constitutional,l47 Instead, 
without identifying exactly what they were doing, they invoked language from the 
Court's four-year-old decision in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One 
v. Holder148-a decision that turned on statutory construction rather than the 
Constitution-and ruled that the act's coverage formula was void because it was not 
"sufficiently related" to the voting problems it targeted.149 
That "sufficiently related" test was not only novel as a matter of the constitutional 
law of voting rights/50 but it was also inherently amorphous and readily manipulable. 
146. 133 S. Ct. at 2625, 2628-30. 
147. ld. at 2637-39 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
148. 557 U.S. 193 (2009). In Northwest Austin, a utility district in Texas sued to avoid the "preclearance" 
provision of the Voting Rights Act, presenting a statutory claim for avoidance and also challenging the 
provision's constitutionality. The Court ruled in the district's favor on its statutory claim and avoided a 
decision on the constitutional claim. Nonetheless, it prefaced its statutory decision with dicta about the 
constitutional issue. Praising the act's "historic accomplishments," id. at 201, and declaring that 
"improvements" in voting rights stand "as a monument" to the act's "success," id. at 202, the Court declared 
that the preclearance provision imposed "federalism costs," id., intruded into areas of state authority, and 
violated the principle of the "equal sovereignty" of the states, id. at 203. The provision, it continued, 
"imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs." ld. Then it offered its standard of 
review, declaring that "a departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing 
that a statute's disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets." !d. 
Avoiding the constitutional issue, it did not apply the sufficiently related standard in Northwest Austin. 
149. 133 S. Ct. at 2630 (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203). 
150. The phrase was novel in terms of voting rights jurisprudence, though it had occasionally been used in 
other contexts. Revealingly, in 1981 a four-justice conservative plurality (then, Justice Rehnquist writing 
for Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justices Potter Stewart and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.) had used the 
phrase to uphold a state statute challenged on gender-discrimination grounds. Michael M. v. Super. Ct. 
of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464, 473 (1981). There, the four conservatives used the phrase "sufficiently 
related" to create a lower and less demanding standard than the "intermediate scrutiny" standard 
(requiring that means and ends be substantially related) the Court had previously applied to gender-
discrimination claims in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Indeed, Rehnquist stated explicitly 
that the sufficiently related standard required "great deference" to the legislature. Michael M., 450 U.S. 
at 470. Thus, in Michael M., four conservatives used the "sufficiently related" phrase to avoid precedent 
in order to apply a less demanding and highly deferential standard that allowed them to uphold the 
statute at issue and thereby deny a discrimination claim. In Shelby County, the five conservatives also 
used that same phrase to avoid precedent, but this time they did so in order to apply a more demanding 
and minimally deferential standard that allowed them to invalidate the statute at issue and thereby 
negate a legislative safeguard against discrimination. Thus, the sufficiently related test was amorphous 
and indeterminate, and justices could deploy it flexibly to either uphold or invalidate challenged 
legislative enactments. In the two cases, of course, the consistency came only in the result: Conservative 
justices used the test in both cases to defeat the cause of civil rights and the goals of anti-discrimination 
law. For a similar result-oriented use of the same accordion-like phrase, "sufficiently related," see infra 
note 156. 
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Indeed, it appeared to be a vaguer version of the "congruence and proportionality" 
test that the Court had established in City of Boerne v. Flores 151 to limit the power of 
Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment.152 In Northwest Austin, the party 
challenging the Voting Rights Act had urged the Court to adopt Boerne's more 
demanding congruence and proportionality test instead of a rational basis test. In 
that case, however, the Court refused to do so.153 Instead, it finessed the issue by 
employing fresh words to characterize a new constitutional standard. The proper 
test, Northwest Austin announced, was whether a statutory provision was sufficiently 
related to the problem it sought to remedy. 
Northwest Austin's sufficiently related test was the constitutional standard the five 
conservatives in Shelby County claimed to apply.154 Their selection and use of that test 
suggest three critical conclusions. First, the sufficiently related test is, in effect, 
another form of Boerne's congruence and proportionality test. Compared to the 
rational basis test, both demand some uncertain and unspecified amount oflegislative 
fact-finding to justify statutory mandates and some kind of relatively close, but 
indeterminate and elastic, fit between statutory means and ends.155 Second, the five 
conservatives were compelled to use those new words to describe the higher standard 
they proclaimed in Shelby County because Justice Antonin Scalia, who provided the 
essential fifth vote to invalidate the challenged provision, had previously and quite 
bluntly rejected by name the congruence and proportionality test.156 Thus, in order to 
151. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
152. The Court used the Boerne test to limit Congress's enforcement power under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in private suits for damages brought against states and state agencies. The conservative 
majority had previously deployed it to limit other civil rights laws. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 
528 U.S. 62 (2000); Bd. ofTrs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
153. 557 U.S. at 204. 
1 54. 133 S. Ct. at 2630. 
1 55. The congruence and proportionality test requires "a congruence and proportionality between the injury 
to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end." Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. The sufficiently 
related test "requires an Act's 'disparate geographic coverage' to be 'sufficiently related' to its targeted 
problems." Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2630 (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203). To meet their 
requirements, both tests impose evidentiary burdens of a qualitatively and quantitatively uncertain nature 
on Congress, and both consequently allow ample leeway for highly disparate and subjective applications. 
Further, as Justice Scalia pointed out in rejecting the congruence and proportionality test, the sufficiently 
related test "has no demonstrable basis in the text of the Constitution and cannot objectively be shown to 
have been met or failed." Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 558 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See infta 
text accompanying notes 156-57 and examples supra note 150. 
156. Justice Scalia had previously employed the phrase "sufficiently related" in one of his most dubiously 
reasoned opinions. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 505 (1988) (Scalia,].). There, in a tort 
action against a product manufacturer brought by the father of a deceased soldier, Scalia used the 
indeterminate scope of the phrase to stretch for a connection beween the tort claim at issue and a state 
law involving privity of contract-a law the state had apparently abandoned twenty-eight years 
previously-in order to help justify his use of a contract precedent to support a tort law ruling. The only 
actual connection in the case between the tort claim and any contract was the fact that the claim arose 
from an injury allegedly caused by the defective design of a product made for the United States pursuant 
to the government's contract with the product manufacturer. The government was not a party to the 
suit, and its contract was not at issue in any way. In Boyle, the stretch helped justify the creation of a new 
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enable Scalia to join the majority opinion, the conservatives had to employ some 
alternative formulation to characterize their new and more demanding test. 
"Sufficiently related" would serve. 
Third, and most important, Scalia had rejected the congruence and proportionality 
test because he believed that it was unavoidably subjective and constitutionally 
unfounded. That test, Scalia had declared, "like all such flabby tests, is a standing 
invitation to judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven decisionmaking."157 Indeed, 
Scalia indicted the congruence and proportionality test on grounds that the five were 
compelled to ignore because those grounds equally indicted their sufficiently related 
test. 
As a general matter, we are ill advised to adopt or adhere to constitutional rules 
that bring us into constant conflict with a coequal branch of Government. And 
when conflict is unavoidable, we should not come to do battle with the United 
States Congress armed only with a test ("congruence and proportionality") that 
has no demonstrable basis in the text of the Constitution and cannot objectively 
be shown to have been met or failed.158 
Scalia's analysis of the congruence and proportionality test applied equally to Shelby 
County's amorphous and essentially ad hoc sufficiently related test, and that analysis 
identified precisely why the decision in Shelby County flowed not from the Constitution 
but from the "policy-driven decisionmaking" of the five conservative justices. 
Finally, revealing Shelby County's ideological roots even more starkly, the five 
chose to justify their higher sufficiently related standard-and ultimately their whole 
decision-by invoking "the principle that all States enjoy equal sovereignty."159 In 
selecting and applying that principle, they made two free and logically unforced 
choices that made it clear that their decision was not compelled by law, the 
Constitution, or even by the very principle they invoked. 
federal common law rule that barred plaintiff's tort claim and deprived him of his $725,000 recovery. 
I d. If the tort claim in Boyle was sufficiently related to the government's contract, then the coverage 
tormula in the Voting Rights Act could surely have been found to be sufficiently related to the problem 
the act targeted. 
157. Lane, 541 U.S. at 554, 557 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
158. I d. at 558 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The year before Shelby County came down, justice Scalia reiterated his 
denunciation of the congruence and proportionality test, insisting again that it "makes no sense" because 
"that flabby test is 'a standing invitation to judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven decisionmaking.'" 
(quoting his dissent in Lane, 541 U.S. at 557-58). Coleman v. Court of Appeals, 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1338 
(2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
159. 133 S. Ct. at 2618. The majority repeatedly invoked this principle. See id. at 2621-24, 2630. For support, 
it again relied on Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 206-11. There, deciding the case on statutory rather 
than constitutional grounds, Chief Justice Roberts inserted language about state equality and possible 
constitutional problems with the Voting Rights Act. In Shelby County he deployed that language. The 
Court's liberals, apparently not anticipating the ways in which the conservatives would use the language, 
had joined Roberts's opinion, a fact that Roberts emphasized in Shelby County. 133 S. Ct. at 2621, 2630. 
Justice Ginsburg responded tartly to his comments, noting that recognizing in Northwest Austin "the 
existence of'serious constitutional questions' does not suggest how those questions should be answered." 
Id. at 2637 n.3 (Ginsburg,]., dissenting). 
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First, in applying the principle of state equality, they chose to stretch it far beyond 
its previous applications. The Court's relevant precedents required the equal treatment 
of states only when they were admitted to the Union, not when the federal government 
acted subsequently to regulate actions taking place within their borders.160 Thus, the 
principle as previously applied did not reach the facts of Shelby County, and only the 
majority's discretionary choice to extend it more widely made it relevant. 
Second, and more fundamental, the conservatives never explained why they 
chose to rest on the principle of state equality in the first place.161 Even as stretched, 
that principle conflicted sharply with another constitutional principle that was-in a 
case involving both potential racial discrimination and the fundamental right to 
vote-of comparable, if not far greater, weight: The principle that all citizens have 
an equal right to vote and that governments have a duty to protect that equal right. 
Those two conflicting principles presented a choice between a principle that could 
be used to void the statute and a principle that could be used to uphold it.162 The 
choice the five conservative justices made was a free one, unforced by law, logic, 
principle, or the Constitution. They chose the former, and their choice evidenced, on 
yet another ground, that their decision was driven by an ideological imperative. 
Consistent with its inspiration, Shelby County may have far-reaching and damaging 
consequences for the cause of civil rights and, indeed, for the future of the nation's 
electoral democracy.163 As everyone familiar with recent political developments is 
160. The Court acknowledged that its precedents-at least before Roberts's seed dicta in Northwest Austin-
established only a narrow principle of state equality. "Coyle [v. Smith] concerned the admission of new 
States, and [South Carolina v.] Katzenbach rejected the notion that the principle [of state equality] 
operated as a bar on differential treatment outside that context." 133 S. Ct. at 2623-24. Justice Ginsburg 
made the same point in her dissent. Id. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
161. lndeed, even assuming that some principle of state equality was applicable to the case, the majority 
never explained why that principle required the subjective and amorphous sufficiently related standard 
of review, why it did not require the Court to defer to the substantial findings that Congress had made, 
and why on the facts of the case it authorized the Court to trump the constitutional principles that 
called for the contrary result. 
162. "Nowhere in today's opinion, or in Northwest Austin," Justice Ginsburg noted, "is there clear recognition 
of the transformative effect the Fifteenth Amendment aimed to achieve." 133 S. Ct. at 2637 (Ginsburg, 
]., dissenting). To the same effect, the majority ignored the principle that the right to vote is 
"fundamental" and that restrictions on that right should accordingly be judged under a "strict scrutiny" 
standard. Harperv. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966). 
163. The immediate result of the decision means that those denied the franchise have no remedy except the 
exceptionally costly, burdensome, and largely ineffective option of litigation. As Justice Ginsburg 
pointed out, "litigation places a heavy financial burden on minority voters," and in any event comes 
"only after the fact, when the illegal voting scheme has already been put in place." 133 S. Ct. at 2640 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). More importantly, as a matter of current politics, the significance of Shelby 
County lies in what is unquestionably "current." The majority's decision emphasized that Congress could 
enact a new version of§ 4(b) by developing and providing evidentiary support for a new and "current" 
formula to identify "covered jurisdictions." 133 S. Ct. at 2631. Not surprisingly, the lawyers who 
represented Shelby County pointed contentedly to the same option. "It's now Congress's move," they 
wrote. Consovoy & .McCarthy, supra note 136, at 31, 33. As a "current" matter, however, that option 
seems a nullity, for it ignores the fact that Republicans control the House, will likely continue to do so 
under the laws they have passed gerrymandering state and federal legislative districts, and will almost 
certainly refuse to act in a way that will provide effective protection for eligible voters. Indeed, the 
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aware,164 for more than a decade Republicans have been making increasingly 
widespread and energetic efforts to suppress voting among social and economic groups 
that tend to vote Democratic, especially blacks and other disadvantaged minorities.165 
Shelby County not only freed "covered jurisdictions" to join that campaign, but also 
encouraged Republicans in other states to redouble their efforts to do the same.166 
current political context gives the Republicans something close to a "lock-in" power to block such 
remedial legislation through control of the House, gerrymandered state and federal legislative districts, 
voter suppression laws, unlimited campaign funds, and backing from the Court's conservative majority. 
164. Shortly before Shelby County came down, for example, three books-among many other studies that 
were available at the time-made clear what was at stake. "All across the country following the 2010 
midterms Republican legislatures passed and governors enacted a series oflaws designed to make voting 
more difficult for Obama's constituency-minorities, especially the growing Hispanic community; the 
poor; students; and the elderly or handicapped." MAY, supra note 55, at 241. When in control of the 
federal government and some states, especially in the South, a second study found, Republicans had 
used a variety of methods to make it more difficult for black politicians to run for office, win, or enjoy 
successful careers. Under Reagan and the first George Bush, for example, "black elected officials were 
five times more likely than their white counterparts to be investigated by the DOJ" for "official 
corruption." GEORGE DEREK MusGROVE, RuMoR, REPRESSION, AND RACIAL PoLITics: How THE 
HARASSMENT OF BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS SHAPED PoST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 5 (2012). The 
late twentieth century witnessed the formation of "a new racial terrain on which historical actors 
continue to employ repression and the politics of race in their struggles for power." Id. at 9. The third 
book surveyed the history of voter suppression efforts and dealt at length with recent Republican tactics. 
"Overall," it declared, "as has been the case over the last five decades, it was Republicans who 
predominantly engaged in vote suppression tactics through manipulation of the laws and procedures." 
WANG, supra note 117, at 94. 
165. See, e.g., Steven F. Huefner & Edward B. Foley, The }udicialization of Politics: The Challenge of the ALI 
Principles of Election Law Project, 79 BROOK. L. REv. 551 (2014). It now seems well-understood that laws 
making it easier and more convenient to vote-early voting, election-day registration, longer electoral 
periods, extended polling hours, and the availability of provisional ballots-commonly favor Democratic 
candidates, while laws that do the opposite (including laws that require some form of official proof of 
identification) tend to favor Republican candidates. See, e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VoTING WARS: 
FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT ELECTION MELTDOWN (2012); WENDY R. WEISER & LAWRENCE 
NoRDEN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JusTICE, VoTING LAw CHANGES IN 2012 (2011), available at http://www. 
brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Democracy/VRE/Brennan_ Voting_Law_ V10.pdf; Edward 
B. Foley, A Big Blue Shift: Measuring an Asymmetrically Increasing Margin of Litigation, 28 J.L. & PoL. 501 
(2013); Edward B. Foley, Thinking About Some Possible Ohio Numbers, MoRITZ C.L. (Nov. 6, 2012, 7:22 
PM), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/election-law/article/?article=10135; Dan Froomkin, Republican Voter 
Suppression Campaign Rolls Back Early Voting, BuFFINGTON PosT (Aug. 18, 2012), http://www. 
hu ffi ngton post. com/2 012/0 8/18/repu b lican -voter-suppression-ea rly-voting_n_17 66172. h tml. 
166. In a surprisingly overt opinion five years earlier, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, 
proposed an approach that provided ample leeway for-and seemed to encourage-those who sought to 
enact such restrictive voting laws. Concurring in the Court's judgment upholding an Indiana law 
requiring voters to have a government-issued photo ID, Scalia denied the legal relevance of burdens on 
voting that were "merely inconvenient" and declared that there was no valid legal objection to voting 
restrictions merely because they had particularly burdensome "individual impacts" on voters. "Indeed," 
he declared sweepingly in words that seemed to promise a blind eye to cleverly crafted voter restriction 
efforts, "it may even be the case that some laws already on the books are especially burdensome for some 
voters." Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181,204-05,208 (2008) (Scalia,J., concurring 
in the judgment). Further, he seemed to suggest that "general" laws that, as a practical matter, had a 
disproportionate impact on some social groups could not be found unconstitutional. The Court's 
"precedents refute the view that individual impacts are relevant to determining the severity of the 
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"State officials across the South," The New York Times reported a month after Shelby 
County came down, "are aggressively moving ahead with new laws requiring voters to 
show photo identification at the polls after the Supreme Court decision striking down 
a portion of the Voting Rights Act."167 
When the Court decided Shelby County, the public record concerning those voter 
suppression laws was already well established.168 In ten states that required voters to 
show government-issued photo identification, for example, a study issued the year 
before Shelby County found that approximately eleven percent of eligible voters lacked 
such IDs. Those eligible voters included approximately 500,000 Hispanics, 1.2 
million blacks, and more than a million individuals who fell below the federal 
poverty line. For pressing reasons of time, money, distance, and convenience, the 
study pointed out, many of those eligible voters would likely be unable to obtain the 
required ID and, hence, would be barred from the polls.169 Another study found that 
Republicans had pushed voter suppression laws "more aggressively in states with 
more minority voters" and that their "recent wave of restrictive-access legislation is 
rooted in long-standing racial and classist motivations revived for modern 
deployment." Those "recent restrictive voter-access policies introduce still more 
hurdles to those that already exist for minorities and lower-income citizens."170 
Such voter suppression laws-like post-Nixonian Republican political rhetoric-
avoid overt racial references or categories and frame their restrictions in formally · 
neutral and general terms. They achieve their desired de facto results by exploiting 
two practical considerations: first, that various identifiable voter groups have different 
social resources and characteristics; and, second, that as a consequence, restrictive 
laws will likely have disparate impacts on those different groups. Those considerations 
burden" imposed by "a generally applicable, nondiscriminatory voting regulation." I d. at 205. Only "the 
general assessment of the burden" on overall voting was relevant, id. at 207, and only the burden's 
impact "on voters generally" was of constitutional significance, id. at 206. Indeed, he noted specifically 
the constitutional loophole that could be used to defend cleverly drafted voter suppression laws: "Insofar 
as our election-regulation cases rest upon the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment," he declared, 
a voter has no equal protection claim "because, without proof of discriminatory intent, a generally 
applicable law with disparate impact is not unconstitutional." Citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 
248 (1976), he stressed that the "Fourteenth Amendment does not regard neutral laws as invidious ones, 
even when their burdens purportedly foil disproportionately on a protected class." Id. at 207. 
167. Michael Cooper, After Ruling, States Rush to Enact Voting Laws, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2013, at A9. 
168. See supra, notes 159-60 and the sources cited at footnotes 89-91 in Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Paradoxes of 
Court-Centered Legal History: Some Values of Historical Understanding.for A Practical Legal Education, 64 J. 
LEGAL Enuc. 229 (2014). Republicans sought to justify the need for such laws by promoting the threat 
of voter fraud, a problem for which there was virtually no evidence. See, e.g., HASEN, supra note 165. 
169. KEESHA GASKINS & SuNDEEP IYER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JusTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF OBTAINING 
VoTER IDENTIFICATION (2012), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/ 
Democracy/VRE/Challenge_of_Obtaining_ Voter_ID.pdf. 
170. Keith G. Bentele & Erin E. O'Brien,]im Crow 2.0? Why States Consider and Adopt Restricti·ve Voter Access 
Policies, 11 PERSP. ON PoL. 1088, 1106 (2013). "(G]iven the internal dynamics of the GOP and the 
current political landscape facing that party, we expect the incentives to engage in suppression and other 
electoral manipulations to remain heightened and to pose a continuing and significant threat to full 
electoral participation in the years to come." ld. 
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mean that, in practice, such voter restrictions are likely to disproportionately burden 
blacks, other minorities groups, the elderly, the disabled, and the poor-all social 
groups that tend to vote Democratic.171 A study of a restrictive Pennsylvania voter ID 
law enacted in 2012, for example, found that "voters from predominately black 
districts" were "eighty-five percent more likely to be disenfranchised by the new law" 
than other voters. 172 Openly acknowledging the law's purpose, the Republican 
majority leader of the Pennsylvania House stated that his state's new voter ID law "is 
gonna [sic] allow [Republican] Governor Romney to win the state of Pennsylvania" 
in the coming presidential election.173 Two years later, on the basis of elaborate and 
detailed findings made after extensive evidentiary hearings, federal courts in 
Wisconsin and Texas found that state laws requiring special voter IDs placed 
disproportionate practical burdens on the right of minorities and the poor to vote. 
Both courts declared the laws unconstitutional and enjoined their enforcement.174 
Moreover, beyond showing Republican efforts to suppress black and minority 
voting, mounting evidence also suggests that active racial prejudices and white racial 
resentments continue to exert a heavy influence on American politics.175 Racial 
discrimination and disparities still exist widely across American society,176 and 
171. Hayley Trahan-Liptak, Prohibiting Barriers to the Booth: The Case for Limited Nationwide Preclearance 
Under a Modified Voting Rights Act, 34 B.C. J.L. & Soc. Just. 151, 151-56 (2014). The method of using 
non-racial categories to indirectly target blacks was hardly new. See generally IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN 
AFFIRMATIVE AcTION WAs WHITE: AN UNTOLD STORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TwENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICA (2005). 
172. Trahan-Liptak, supra note 171, at 152. See, e.g., Ari Berman, Partisan Pennsylvania Voter ID Law Wrongly 
Upheld by Court, NATION (Aug. 15, 2012, 2:17PM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/169409/partisan-
pennsylvania-voter-id-law-wrongly-upheld-court; VoTER ID CLIENT Bws, ACLU PENNSYLVANIA, 
http://www.aclupa.org/our-work/legalllegaldocket/applewhite-et-al-v-commonwealth-pennsylvania-
et-al/voter-id-clients/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2015). 
173. Mackenzie Weinger, Mike Turzai: Voter JD Helps GOP Win State, PoLITICO Oune 25, 2012, 4:26PM), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0612/77811.html. Accord Luke Johnson, Mike Turzai, Pennsylvania 
GOP House Majority Leader: Voter ID Will Allow Mitt Romney to Win State, HuFFINGTON PosT, (June 25, 
2012, 5:31 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/25/mike-turzai-voter-id_n_1625646.hnn. 
174. Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Wis. 2014), rev'd, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014); Veasey v. 
Perry, No. 13-CV-00193, 2014 WL 5090258 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2014). 
175. For the views of blacks about continuing prejudice and discrimination, see generally, e.g., FEAGIN & 
SIKES, supra note 114. In early 2014, to take one random example, a police commissioner in New 
Hampshire, who was also a lawyer, referred to President Obama with "a vulgarity and a racial slur." The 
commissioner subsequently stated that "[he] believed [he] did use the 'N' word in reference to the current 
occupant of the Whitehouse [sic]" and staunchly defended his action. "For this, I do nor apologize-
[Obama] meets and exceeds my criteria for such." Katharine Q Seelye &Jess Bidgood, Police Official in 
New Hampshire Resigns Amid Uproar Over Slur Against Obama, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2014, at A15, 
available at http:/ /nytimes.com/20 14/05/20/us/pol ice-official-who-used -slur- agai nst-obama-steps-
down.hrml. See generally MATTHEW PRATT GuTERL, SEEING RACE IN MoDERN AMERICA (2013). 
176. See George E. Curry, Racial Disparities Drive Prison Boom, in NAT'L URBAN LEAGUE, THE STATE OF 
BLACK AMERICA 2006, at 10. See also GEORGE E. CuRRY ET AL., THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA, 2006 
(2006); BARBARA s. MEIERHOEFER, THE GENERAL EFFECT OF MANDATORY l\1INIMUM PRISON TERMS 
3-5, 17, 20 (1992); PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008 (2008); 
David R. Williams & Pamela Braboy Jackson, Social Sources of Racial Disparities in Health, 24 HEALTH 
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evidence from a variety of sources demonstrates the sharp and perhaps growing impact 
of racial prejudice against blacks and particularly against President Barack Obama.177 
The evidence further shows that those racial prejudices and white racial resentments 
are driving both voting behavior and judgments on substantive policy issues.178 
That mass of evidence highlights not only Shelby County's likely political impact 
but also the callous irony of its insistence on the need for "current" data. In fact, 
current data in a multitude of forms readily demonstrates that racial prejudices are 
shaping political views, that voter suppression laws are increasingly endangering the 
right to vote, and that those laws are likely to substantially and disproportionately 
burden blacks, minorities, and other disadvantaged social groups. Together with the 
record Congress assembled, such "current" evidence demonstrates-under any 
conceivably legitimate constitutional standard-the validity of the challenged 
provision of the Voting Rights Act and cries out for its continued necessity. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Shelby County was a blow to those who continue to share King's dream. It was a 
significant step backwards in American politics and an unjustified step backwards in 
constitutional jurisprudence. It dredged up memories of earlier social conditions in 
AFF. 325 (2005). According to the Federal Reserve, for example, in 2012, blacks were denied mortgages 
for home purchases at much higher rates than whites, 32 percent for blacks compared to 11.6 percent for 
whites. Peter Eavis, Dispute Over Banking Group's Analysis of Mortgage Denials to Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 24, 2014, at B3. For similar crimes, black males and Native Americans receive longer prison 
sentences than do white males, and new restrictions on voting in many states "disproportionally 
disenfranchise African Americans, Hispanics, [and] other communities of color" as well as "vulnerable 
populations such as the elderly." Eric Holder, Transcript: Attorney General Eric Holder's Speech to Morgan 
State University Graduates, WASH. PosT (May 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
transcript-attorney-general-eric-holders-speech -to-morgan -srate-u niversi ry-grad u ates/2014/05/ 17 I 
d6b72284-ddd0-11e3-b745-87d39690c5cO_story.html. Blacks have long been more vulnerable to 
economic downturns than whites, Bradley T. Ewing, The Differential Effects of Output Shocks on 
Unemployment Rates by Race and Gender, 68 S. EcoN. J. 584 (2002), and unemployment has been higher 
for blacks than whites for a century. Robert W. Fairlie & William A. Sundstrom, The Emergence, 
Persistence, and Recent Widening of the Racial Unemployment Gap, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 252 
(1999). 
177. While many whites were prepared to vote for Obama, more were not. Many of those anti-Obama voters 
apparently acted on the basis of his race. See, e.g., Benjamin Highton, Pnjudice Rivals Partisanship and 
Ideology When Explaining the 2008 Presidential Vote Across the States, 44 PS: PoL. Sc1. & PoL. 530 (2011); 
Spencer Piston, How Explicit Racial Prejudice Hurt Obama in the 2008 Election, 32 PoL. BEHAVIOR 431 
(2010); David P. Redlawsk et al., Voters, Emotions, and Race in 2008: Obama as the First Black President, 
63 PoL. RESEARCH Q 875 (2010); Michael S. Lewis-Beck & Charles Tien, Race Blunts the Economic 
Effect? The 2008 Obama Forecast, 42 PS: PoL. Sci. & PoL. 687 (2009). 
178. See, e.g., MICHAEL TESLER & DAVID 0. SEARS, 0BAMA's RAcE: THE 2008 ELECTION AND THE DREAM 
oF A PosT-RACIAL AMERICA (2010); DoNALD R. KINDER & ALLISON DALE-RIDDLE, THE END OF 
RACE? OsAMA, 2008, AND RACIAL PoLITICS IN AMERICA (2012); Eric D. Knowles et al., Race, Ideology, 
and the Tea Party: A Longitudinal Study (2013), available at http://www.plosone.org/article/ 
info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0067110; Eric D. Knowles et al., Racial Prejudice Predicts 
Opposition to Obama arui his Health Care Reform Plan, 46 J. ExPERIMENTAL Soc. PsYCH. 420 (2010); 
Cheryl R. Kaiser et al., The Ironic Consequences ofObama's Election: Decreased Support for Social justice, 45 
J. ExPERIMENTAL Soc. PsYcH. 556 (2009). 
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America, of hard-earned progress subsequently achieved, and of the galvanizing 
values that inspired the March and found their voice in the Speech. Most acutely, it 
brought back memories of the exhilaration that came with passage of the great Civil 
Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965. Those memories and those values suggest that, 
although Shelby County turned its back on the cause of equal voting rights, it will 
ultimately prove-as the better angels of our nature rise once again-a more serious 
and more enduring blow to the reputation of the Roberts Court. The opinion of the 
five conservative justices stands, and will continue to stand, as a towering monument 
to the ideological roots of their constitutional jurisprudence. 
"It gets discouraging sometimes,"179 King acknowledged shortly before his 
assassination. War, urban poverty, white intransigence, and divisive internal conflicts 
all pressed on him with ever more staggering weight. His hopes were chastened, but 
his faith remained firm. "The dream may not be fulfilled," he declared, "but it's just 
good that you have a desire to bring it into reality. It's well that it's in thine heart."180 
Reflecting on the half century that followed the March and the "I Have a Dream" 
speech, it seems clear that we as a nation have both advanced and backtracked-
succeeded and fallen away. Despite everything, however, the dream of justice and 
equality for all remains firmly rooted in our national ideals and in the true meaning 
and purpose of our fundamental law. The March and the Speech have helped preserve 
that dream in our hearts, as King so fervently hoped, and they will continue to inspire 
ever-reviving efforts in the future once again to move that dream closer to reality. 
179. KING, AuTOBIOGRAPHY supra note 30, at 357. 
180. Id. 
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